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RETHINKING LEGISLATIVE CONSENT LAW?
Michele Goodwin*

Each act of giving is unique, secret, spontaneous
and inexplicable. There is no accountingfor it, as
1
there is no value in counterfeit coin.
Transplantationcannot escape the income-based
inequities that permeate the larger medical care
2
system.

Carlos M. Gudino appeared twice in the Los Angeles Times
Newspaper. The first time was a kind of turning point or rebirth. He
was only nineteen years old when he worked on a mural with Jesse
Rojas, another young, aspiring artist, trying desperately to move beyond
'Assistant Professor of Law & Health Law Institute Co-Chair, DePaul University
College of Law. LL.M. University of Wisconsin Law School; J.D. Boston College Law School;
B.A. University of Wisconsin. Affiliated Scholar, the Center for the Study of Law & Society at
the University of California Law School (Boalt Hall). A version of this paper was presented at
the Law & Society Meeting in Vancouver, Canada in the Spring of 2002. I would like to thank
the students at the University of Virginia Law & Technology Journal, where this article first
was published the spring of 2001. Also, gratitude to the students at the Journal of Health Care
Law at DePaul University College of Law. Special thanks to Andrea Flynn my research
assistant and to Carolina S. Chang, 2002-03 Editor-in-Chief of the DePaul Journal of Health
Care Law. This article is a reprint of DeconstructingLegislative Consent Law: Organ Taking,
RacialProfiling&DistributiveJustice, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH 2 (2001).
'Desmond Manderson, Introduction: Tales from the Crypt-A Metaphor, An Image, A
Story, in COURTING DEATH: THE LAW OF MORTALITY 10 (Desmond Manderson ed., 1999)
[hereinafter
CotIr1NG DEATH].
2
LAuRIm KAYE ABRAHAM, MAMA MIGHT BE BETTER OFF DEAD 183 (1993).
3
Lisa Richardson, Praisefor His Art Keeps Young MuralistFrom Being Walled in by
Harsh GangLife, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 1992, at B1; Ralph Frammolino, Harvestof Corneas at
Morgue Questioned, L.A. TIMs, Nov. 2, 1997.
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the reach of Los Angeles gang life.4 Their story, one of possible
triumph, or at least of hope, was captured by a bold headline: "Praise
For His Art Keeps Young Muralist From Being Walled In By Harsh
Gang Life."5 A photograph memorialized Carlos' gaze as Jesse applied
the final
touches to the mural of the Madonna that Carlos helped to
6
create.
The Community Youth Gang Services and the Los Angeles Police
Department helped to underwrite the project in an effort to bring calm
to a community riddled by gang violence, teen unemployment, and drug
transactions. 7 The mural is located at a comer in Los Angeles,
California, where Wilmington meets G Street. It is considered a "tough
place," where drug transactions occur nightly and trouble awaits. The
project was aimed at helping the community overcome despair and
transforming the lives of talented young men with a sincere interest at
leaving "gangbanging behind." 8 Although the L.A. Times article
focused considerably on Jesse's artistic talents, Carlos' youthful gaze
was captured forever, giving the vision of hope.
Five years later, almost to the very day, in November 1997, Carlos
again appeared in the same daily newspaper that captured him gazing at
the mural of the Madonna.9 Ironically, his brutal death from twelve
bullet wounds to the head and chest, which had occurred earlier in the
year, was not the focus of the second article. Instead, the article exposed
the questionable harvesting of comeas at the local morgue without prior
consent of deceased "donors" or their relatives. 10 The article raised
questions about the roles of race, socio-economic status, and consent in
this controversial process known as presumed or legislative consent."
The Los Angeles Times contacted Carlos M. Gudino's family as part of
4

Richardson, supra note 3.

5

rd.

6 Id. Richardson notes that "amid the gangbanging and hard living, looking down upon

the frustrations of the jobless young men hungry for recognition, is a just-painted red, yellow,
and green mural of the Virgin Mary." Id.
7Id.
5

Id.
9Framolino, Harvest of Corneas, supra note 3.
'1d.
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a study it was conducting to determine whether or not families were
aware that their loved-ones' corneas had been harvested and sold.
Like all the families in Ralph Frammolino's investigation, the
Gudinos were unaware and shocked that cornea extraction had taken
place. 2 Carlos corneas were harvested without his family's knowledge
or permission. 3 The Gudinos were dismayed that the Los Angeles
coroner's office had the authority to operate in what some have called a
"clandestine" manner, referring to the legislation and process which
presumes that one is willing to be a donor unless a prior refusal has
been recorded, or relatives have objected.1 4 Moreover, the fact that
money was exchanged for his corneas seemed too reminiscent of
slavery, generating potential sensitivity and paranoia about racial
profiling, manipulation, and economic justice.
What made the Gudinos' situation somewhat unique and all the
more troubling, as Carlos' sister, Maria, pointed out in an interview
with Frammolino, was the fact that the family had registered their
objection to any organ or tissue donation the morning after Carlos'
death."5 In fact, their objection, dutifully noted by an investigator from
the coroner's office in a supplemental report, was quite specific:
16
"Family is profoundly against ANY organ or tissue donation."
However, the family's objection was too late; three hours earlier,
Carlos' corneas had been harvested by the Doheny Eye and Tissue
Bank under authorization of the coroner.' 7 Doheny and the coroner's
office had an arrangement whereby corneas were harvested and the
coroner's office was paid "an average of about $250 for a set of corneas,
which [were] then sold to transplant institutions for a 'processing fee' of
12 Id. Frammolino, author of the study involving over five hundred and seventy cases
where corneas were removed without consent from donors or their families during a twelve
month period, comments in his article that all the families "were shocked that they had not
been asked or told."Id.
13 Id.
14 See infra Chapters IV and V.
15 Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas,supra note 3. Carlos, then aged 24 died shortly
before nine o'clock in the evening on March 26, 1997 from head and chest wounds. The next
day his sister called the morgue. She recalls, "my parents told me to let them know they didn't
want any organs donated or anything." Id.
16
1d.
17 Id.
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$3,400. ''18 Carlos' family learned the details of this transaction nearly
eight months after his death. 9
Frammolino's investigation, which involved reviewing 572 cases
during a twelve-month period in which corneas were removed without
family consent or knowledge, uncovered other unsettling information."0
The overwhelming majority of the donors, seventy-two percent, were
young homicide victims. Accident victims, the next largest donor pool,
accounted for only sixteen percent.2 Over eighty percent of the donors
were of color (nearly sixty percent Latino and twenty-one percent
African American). 2 Whites were only sixteen percent of the donor
pool.23 Were it not for Frammolino's investigation, Carlos' family, as
well as others contacted for the study, may never have known about the
legislative consent law or the removal of their loved ones' corneas.
PART I. INTRODUCTION

Ironically, while the poor, and particularly those of color, reside at the
margins of the global technological boom (many are unable to afford
computers, do not have internet access, and have only limited exposure
to computer technology), their bodies are nonetheless at the center of
contemporary ethical debate. Accelerated growth in biotechnology and
medical science is creating new uses for human tissues that were once
presumed to have limited value beyond their original function and
host.24 Tissues, cells, and organs that once would have been buried at
18 Id. According to the L.A. TIMES investigation, the Doheny Eye & Tissue Transplant
Bank paid more than one million dollars over a five-year period (1992-1997) to the Los
Angeles County coroner's office for corneas "harvested without the permission or knowledge
of the families of the dead." Id. Doheny's "markup" was more than 1200% of the purchase
price--or gift--provided to the coroner's office, which was higher than usual, even by industry
standards. Id.
19 Id. Carlos Gudino died March 26, 1997. However, it was not until Frammolino
contacted the family in the course of his investigation later that year that they became aware of
the non-consensual
cornea removal. Id.
20 IdY.
21 [d.

22 Id.

23 Id.
24
See E.

RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN
(1996);
CHRISTOPHER WILLS, EXONS, INTRONS, AND TALKING GENES
THE HUMAN BLUEPRINT: THE RACE TO UNLOCK THE SECRETS OF OUR

BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
(1991); ROBERT SHAPIRO,
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death or disposed of after medical procedures have found new life in
research laboratories and human hosts.25 Through both transplantation
and research, 26biological materials have proven invaluable in saving
peoples' lives.
GENETIC CODE (1991). See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV.L. REv. 1415 (1989); Lawrence J. Nelson et al., ForcedMedical Treatment ofPregnant
Women: "CompellingEach to Live as Seems Good to the Rest, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1986);
John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027 (1994); Michelle B. Bray,
PersonalizingPersonality:Toward a PropertyRight in Human Bodies, 69 Tnx. L. REv. 209
(1990); Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing PropertyRights in
the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207 (1986); Mary T. Danforth,
Cells, Sales and Royalties: The Patient'sRight to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 179 (1988); Erik S. Jaffe, Note, She's Got Bette Davis's Eyes: Assessing The
NonconsensualRemoval of Cadaver Organs Under The Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90
COLtJMB. L. REv. 528 (1990).
2 Corneas and organs are most commonly associated with transplantation and the ability
of science to use human biological material to improve the quality of one's life. However,
transplantation of tissues from aborted fetuses, a technique with origins that predate organ
transplantation, has also been characterized as effective. As early as the late nineteen twenties
(1920s) doctors were transplanting aborted fetal tissues in diabetic patients in Europe. The first
fetal tissue transplantation in the United States did not occur until a decade later, in 1939. By
the nineteen-sixties in the United States, cornea, organ, and fetal tissue transplantations and
experiments had been performed; some were done with greater frequency and efficacy than
others, particularly with regard to comeas. Cornea transplantation predates both aborted fetal
tissue and organ transplantation. As discussed infra, biotechnological advancements with
immune suppressant drugs improved the efficacy of organ transplants. Nevertheless, some level
of controversy has surrounded each of these procedures, either as to allocation and access, or to
the ongoing debates about human dignity and the limits of morality in human experimentation.
See ARTHUR CAPLAN, AM I MY BROTHER'S KEEPER? 40-49 (1997) (discussing fetal tissue
transplantation and the controversy that erupted during former president George H. W. Bush's
administration, in which a ban was imposed on "the use of federal funds to pay for research on
transplants using fetal tissue," and discussing the ethical as well as political implications of
fetal tissue research); GOLD, supra note 24, at 23-26 (discussing the "patient's body" and the
"admixture of property law and the human body"); ROBERT M. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING, AND
THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUmON: OUR LAST QUEST FOR REPONSiBiLrrY (1989); LINDA F. HoGLE,
REcoVERING THE NATION'S BODY: CULTURAL MEMORY, MEDICINE, AND THE POUCTICS OF

REDEMPTION (1999) (discussing how the Schutztaffel, or SS, in Nazi Germany, became
fascinated
2 6 with capabilities of medicine and research on the human body).
UNITD NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARRING, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S.
SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS AND THE ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND
TRANPLANTATION NETWORK (1998) [Hereinafter 1998 ANNUAL REPORT]; See also David E.

Jefferies, The Body as Commodity: The Use of Markets to Cure the Organ Deficit, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, at 622 (1998); Maria Clark, Solving the Kidney Shortage Crisis
Through the Use of Non-Heart-BeatingCadaveric Donors:Legal Endorsement of Perfusionas
a StandardProcedure, 70 IND. L.J. 929 (1995); Jaffe, supra note 24; Beth Brandon, Note,
Anencephalic Infants As OrganDonors: A Question ofLife or Death,40 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
781 (1990). This year an estimated three hundred thousand people worldwide will receive an
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Nevertheless, thousands of Americans die annually from illnesses
involving failed organs.27 Of those who die, some are on waitlists for
organs28 while many others are not.29
Despite technological
advancements, including the growing field of organ transplantation, the
limited supply of human biological materials has not kept pace with an
overwhelming demand. 30 How to resolve, or even characterize, the
great demand for organs has been a point of contention for ethicists,
politicians, and the medical and legal communities. 3 1 Furthermore,
even though other technologies seem promising in addressing

organ transplant. However, that number is overshadowed by the thousands who die each year

while languishing on sometimes stagnant waitlists. Each year the number of patients waiting
for organ donations increases, along with the number of patients who are placed on dialysis or
other treatments or procedures in lieu of organ transplantation. See Ellis Interview infra note
224.
271998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26 at 15-17 (detailing the death rates for the
incidence
28 and prevalence cohorts on the waiting lists for organs).
1d.
29
This may best be illustrated by treatment of kidney failure. For example, not all
patients with kidney failure meet the criteria for organ transplantation. As discussed infra, a
variety of factors contribute to why some patients are placed on an organ waitlist while others
are not. See Kevin McCoy, Deadly Disparity in Transplants: Blacks & HispanicsDeprived,

DAILY Nmws (NEw YoRK), Aug. 8, 1999, at 6. McCoy's investigative study on organ
transplantation in New York revealed racial and socio-economic disparities in the organ
transplantation referral process. He reported that the main factor blocking blacks and Hispanics
from transplants was that they weren't on organ waiting lists. He suggests that this occurs
because their doctors do not refer them to transplant centers or that they are referred too late or
because of lacking health insurance. Id. See also Rod Watson, In Blacks, Tragic Mistrust of
Medicine, THE BumnALo Nmvs, Feb. 22, 2001, at 1B (discussing the affects of race, racism and
perception in the organ transplantation). A kidney patient who is not referred to a waitlist by
her physician can be sustained nonetheless through dialysis, a process that uses a machine to
substitute for the function of the kidney. However, dialysis is expensive and can significantly
alter one's lifestyle and quality of life. Because dialysis usually requires a patient to be
connected to a machine three days per week, for several hours each time, it is often less
desirable than actually having an organ transplantation. Associated Press, Two Studies Find
Disparitiesin Who Gets New Kidneys, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH, Nov. 25, 1999, at AS (noting

that kidney patients who undergo dialysis at commercial centers are less likely to get on a
transplant waiting list--and more likely to die--than patients at nonprofit institution, according
to a study authored by Dr. Pushkal Garg of Johns Hopkins University. Also discussing two
studies revealing racial disparities in kidney transplantation. However, it is debatable whether
and how the option of transplantation is presented to all patients when such procedures may be
medically viable.
30
E.g., GOLD supra note 24, at 141-42.
31
See generally ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS AND REALITIES
(Stuart J. Youngner et al. eds., 1996).
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America's organ shortage, particularly stem cell therapy 32 and even
xenotransplantation, 33 the therapies are too premature to guarantee
success, and thus cannot resolve the present shortage of transplantable
organs. If transplanting human biological materials is the best answer to
replacing failed organs, how to increase the supply of viable organs is a
question of critical importance.
Part II of this article provides an overview of the contemporary
questions surrounding race and the organ allocation process. It attempts
to contextualize the racial, political, economic, and social realities in
the organ transplantation process by first exploring perceptions of
health and the black body. Part IlI defines and analyzes legislative
consent policies. Also in Part III, eye bank directors from across the
country offer their opinions about legislative consent policies. Part IV
challenges the moral framework of presumed consent. It argues that
presumed consent is difficult to justify, particularly because of its very
real racial implications in the United States. Indeed, the practice is
difficult to support even when based on a notion of social compact
theory because of disparities that have a significant racial impact on
organ allocation. This article concludes in Part V by arguing that
because of the attendant health, ethical, and moral concerns
surrounding presumed consent, and evidence that it doeg not comport
with notions of distributive justice, legislative consent is not the
preferred alternative or solution for increasing the supply of organs for
transplantation.

32

This new technology would allow the body to "regrow" organs rather than have a
foreign organ transplanted into the body. See Sarah A. Webster, New Hope for Sick Children: $
IM Gift Launches Blood Cell Center: Karmanos Cancer Institute Will Store Stem Cells that
Fight Minority Diseases, ThE DETROrr Nmvs, December 9, 1999, at Al (Potentially thousands
of children with blood diseases could be helped if the supply of cord blood is increased).
However, Webster notes because umbilical cords contain only about six tablespoons of stem
cells, children are the only candidates for such donations. Doctors need a certain number of
stem cells for the weight of the patient. About 800 pediatric patients worldwide have received
of cord blood stem cells.
transplants
33
For an explanation of xenotransplantation, see Jack M. Kress, Xenotransplantation:
Ethics and Economics, 53 FOOD DRUG L.J. 353 (1998). Kress discusses xenotransplantation,
noting that "for the [Department of Health and Human Services], 'xenotransplantation' refers to
any procedure that involves the use of live cells, tissues, or organs from a non-human animal
source, that are injected, implanted, or transplanted into a human being." Id. at 354.
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PART II. RACIAL BIAS IN HEALTHCARE: THE UNEXPLORED FRONTIER

Although studies indicate that as many as eighty-five percent of
Americans support organ donations, fewer than twenty percent actually
carry donor cards. 34 The reluctance to donate, as discussed infra, has
been attributed to distrust of the medical establishment and racial and
religious concerns, 35 as well as other considerations. 36 Arguably, efforts
to address some of these issues have yielded some gains in the number
of transplantable organs. However, the overall increase in viable organs
has been limited and cannot keep pace with the great demand,
particularly for groups of color.
While equity and access issues have emerged in the medical
literature, within the context of the law, racial biases and disparities in
healthcare seem to be relatively unexplored.37 Little legal scholarship
has been devoted to the intersection of race, healthcare, and the law,
particularly regarding sophisticated technologies such as organ
transplantation.3 8 One Might argue that distributive justice in healthcare
was one of the most important areas that was overlooked or not
adequately addressed during America's civil rights era.
Race, gender and socio-economic factors should not be ignored in
the discussion about organ allocation and transplantation, but rather
should motivate interest and research. However, the ability to truly
understand the implications of race, gender, and class discrimination
with regard to healthcare access, and particularly organ transplantation,
34

OrganAllocation: A NationalRoundup, AM. HEALTH LINE, Aug. 11, 1999 (noting the
paradox).
35Norma Adams-Wade, A Life-Giving Change; Officials Hope Rule Boosts Minorities'
Organ Donations, DALLAS MORN. NEWs, November 29, 1999, at 17A.
36See infra notes, 39-40.
37Barbara Noah, Racial Disparitiesin The Delivery ofHealth Care, 35 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 135 (1998). Noah argues that "the role that conscious or unconscious racial bias may play
in the health care context has, by comparison, attracted comparatively little public attention."
Id. at 137.
381d. See generally Vernellia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation and Racism: Trusting the
Health Care System Ain't Always Easy! An African American Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST.
Louis U. PuB. L. Rev. 191 (1996). Professor Randall's research examines the intersection of
race, law and medicine. She comments on historical and contemporary uses of racism as an
institutional construct that limits African American access to healthcare and life-saving
treatments. She also points to the need for greater inclusion and visibility of people of color in
the study of the intersection of medicine and law.
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may be constrained by the limited scholarship that is currently available
on the topic. Empirical studies on the effects of race and social status
discrimination in the distribution of organs generally are not available,
demonstrating, perhaps, a lack of interest in the topic on the part of
mainstream bioethicists. On the other hand, the noticeable absence of
research studies in this area might be attributed to an unawareness of
the issue's importance, the inherent complications of and obstacles to
collecting data, or the difficulty of identifying and articulating the more
subtle nuances of racism and poverty in healthcare. Some have
suggested that most medical school faculty and students are culturally
unequipped and lack a competency in working with diverse
populations. This, some observe, is exacerbated by the stunningly39low
percentage of African Americans graduating with medical degrees.
An unprecedented demand for organs, particularly from
communities of color, and the potential to save lives through available
technology has forced a fundamental reconsideration of the legal,
ethical, medical and moral issues associated with organ
transplantation. 40 Ethical questions abound as legislators, ethicists and
39

See Henry Lewis, III, Different Prescriptionsfor Florida'sShortage ofDoctors;FAMU
Deserves LargerRole in State's Medical Education;THE TAMPA TRIBUNE, Mar. 20, 1999, at 15
(articulating the need for an additional medical school in Florida which would enroll more
students of color, noting that minorities are underrepresented at all levels of medicine). Lewis
report found that in 1997, black Americans, Hispanics and American Indians/Alaska natives
represented approximately 23.6 percent of the population, but only 12.2 percent of enrollees in
allopathic medical schools were underrepresented minorities. Id. Note also that between 1996
and 1997 there was over a seven percent (7%) decline in underrepresented minority new
entrants to U.S. medical schools. Id.
The American Association of Medical Colleges offers far more dramatic statistics. Their
web page notes that, minority enrollments in U.S. medical schools reached their peak in 1975,
when minorities represented 8.1 percent of the total student body. Since then, however, a
leveling-off effect has dominated, and no significant increase in the number of
underrepresented minorities entering medical school has occurred. Ass'N OF AM. MED.
COLLEGES, AAMC STATEMENT ON MED. EDUC. OF MINORITY GROUP STUDENTS (June 1987), at
http://vwvw.aamc.org/meded/minority/recruit/statemin.htm. See also Why a Nationwide Ban on
Race-Conscious Admissions Will Sharply CurtailBlack Enrollments as the Nation's HighestRanked Medical Schools, 23 J. BLACKS INHIGHER EDUC. 22 (Spring 1999); Minority Entrants
to California Med Schools Down 32 Percent, MED. & HEALTH, Apr. 26, 1999, available in
199940WL 10391837.
See Ralph Frammolino, L.A. Coroner Alters Policy on Corneas, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1997 at AI; Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas, supra note 3; Official Knew About Cornea
Removals, LAS VEGAS REv.-J. AND LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 23, 1997, at 11 B; Betsy Butgereit,
Plan Would Require Cornea Removal OK, BIRMINGHAM NEWs (Alabama), Feb. 17, 1998, at
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organ procurement organizations debate the best methods to increase
organ supply.41 Among the possible solutions currently debated to
alleviate the demand for organs are two provocative possibilities:
presumed consent and commercialization. Neither method is presently
used with regard to organ procurement in the United States; a federal
ban prohibits the sale of organs,42 and presumed consent is used only
with regard to corneas and eye tissues in some states. 43 Nonetheless,
both methods are touted as possible solutions to what politicians are
calling an "organ crisis." This article will explore organ allocation and
transplantation, specifically addressing presumed or legislative consent
policies and the attendant difficulties of justifying their use through
social contract theory.
Presumed consent is a highly controversial method for remedying
organ and tissue shortages, as evidenced by the fact that it has been
plagued by legal and ethical problems when used with regard to cornea
removal.44 The statutes authorizing legislative consent for use of
corneas permit the medical examiner or justice of the peace, or their
agents, to extract the corneas and sometimes other tissue (including the
entire eye) from cadavers if an autopsy is scheduled to be performed,
and no objection to the removal is known.4a
The medical examiner

1A [hereinafter Cornea Removal OK]; Betsy Butgereit, Cornea Controversy: Eye Banks Don't
See Eye-to-You on Laws, BRMiNGHAM Naws (Alabama), Feb. 16, 1998, at 1A [hereinafter
Controversy]; Celia Sibley, Widow Wins Unwilling Eye Donor Suit, ATLANTA J., Jan.1, 1998,
at AO1.
41
Among the ethical considerations at issue with respect to organ transplantation are
devotion to patient's goals, distributive justice, contributive justice, and preservation of human
dignity. For a general discussion of these considerations, see John J. Paris, Managed Care,
FinancialIncentives, and Cost Control: Shifts in the Ethical Focus of Health Care Delivery
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Edmund Pelligrino, RationingHealth Care: The
Ethics ofMedical Gatekeeping, 2 J. CoNTEw. HEALTH L. POL'Y 23-45 (1986); CAPLAN, supra
note 25;
NoRM DANiELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985).
42
See The National Organ Transplantation Act, 42 U.S.C 273 (1994) [hereinafter NOTA];
The Organ Procurement Transplantation Network was established out of 42 U.S.C. 274 (a)-(b)
(1994).
43
See Bad Publicity Could Reduce Cornea Supply, REv. OF OPTHAMALOGY, Dec. 1997, at
3.
4Id.
45

For an example of a presumed consent or "medical examiner" or "legislative consent"
statute, see Md. Statute 4-509.1 When Chief Medical Examiner or His Deputy Or Assistant
May Provide Cornea for Transplant.
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may delegate this right to a physician or eye bank.4 6 Its proponents
suggest that presumed consent increases tissue supply while respecting
"donor" autonomy and individual choice by virtue of an "opt out"
provision for prior refusal.47
Medical examiner laws were passed in twenty-eight states, and
most were promulgated during the mid-nineteen eighties (1980s), a
time that some commentators recall as being marked by violence and
death in urban communities of color.48 Some eye bank officials,
including those from California and Alabama, credit presumed consent
laws for the increase in corneal tissues available for transplantation in
their states.49 Indeed, data from these states indicate that corneas
available for transplantation did increase, particularly as more tissues
were available from victims of trauma and homicides.5 0 In some
instances, surpluses were created which allowed tissue banks to sell
"left-over" tissues to medical research laboratories, sometimes at
tremendous markups.51

46

1d.

47

See CAPLAN, supra note 25, at 125.
48See DeWayne Wickham, Americas Smaller Communities Getting Taste of Urban
Violence GANNET NEws SERVICE, May 25, (citation omitted) (noting rise in violence in the
1980s); Gabriel Escobar, Deaths Pose Continuing D.C. Mystery; City Carries Hundreds of
Undetermined Cases, Muddying Vital Statistics, WAsH. POST, December 22, 1997, at Al
(commenting on the rise in urban violence in the 1980s and that many of the deaths of black
urban Americans from that era remain unsolved); Glen Loury, The Impossible Dilemma, Tim
Nmv RPuBuc, January 1, 1996, at 21 (noting that the murder rate among black youths
(persons under age 20), which was already three times that of white youths in 1986, doubled in
the five years between 1986 and 1991, while the rate among whites remained unchanged). See
also Darryl Fears, Urban Spotlight: Is Atlanta the Next Detroit? TnE ATLANTA JOURNAL AND
CONSTImmON, December 18, 1994, at DI (pointing out that in the early 1980s, the homicide
rate soared). Fears reports that between 1983 and 1987, more than 700 people were slain each
year. On No Crime Day in Detroit - a 1986 event sponsored by basketball star Isaiah Thomas to
prove49his city was still safe - a police officer was shot dead. Id.
Telephone interview with Doyce Williams, Executive Director of the Alabama Eye Bank
(Feb. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Williams Interview 1]. Mr. Williams expressed his great support
for presumed consent legislation, and asserted that legislative consent had a very positive
influence on the number of comeas that were made available for transplantation. See also
Frammolino, L.A. Coroner,supra note 40.
50 Telephone Interview with Doyce Williams, Executive Director of the Alabama Eye
Bank (Feb. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Williams Interview II].
51 See Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas,supra note 3.
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However, whether or not presumed consent has always worked
effectively is debatable. 52 Some concerns of opponents of presumed
consent are highlighted by problems regarding tissue extractions
without consent: the possibility of transmitting communicable diseases
where health or social histories have not been obtained, transplanting
low-quality biological materials, and failure to obtain consent. They
also argue that any policy that limits donor autonomy and ignores
family consent is fundamentally flawed.53
Nonetheless, presumed consent proponents argue that saving the
living should be society's greatest concern and presumed consent is a
method for doing just that. Furthermore, some commentators point out
that many of the legislative consent statutes offer a right for the donor
to refuse the extraction. The "opt-out" provision, they say, actually
allows for one to revoke consent.
Whether an increased supply of organs should be the prime or sole
focus of an ethical and equitable procurement policy seems a relevant
and timely question. 54 Further, it appears debatable whether other
procurement methods, which are less intrusive with regard to privacy
and autonomy, would not prove more successful. Some eye bank
directors interviewed for this study strongly suggest that presumed
consent might not be the best method for increasing the supply of
healthy organs and tissues. 55 They argue that eye banks using strict
52
Frammolino, L.A. Coroner, supra note 40. Frammolino highlights the controversy
surrounding cornea transplantation and presumed consent legislation, noting the potentials for
abuse53of the policy and for racial discrimination. Id.
See, e.g., Interview with Mark Larson, Executive Director of the Eyebank of Wisconsin,
in Madison, Wis. (Feb. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Larson Interview]; Interview with Dr. Jim
Martin, Executive Director of the Louisville Eye Bank (Mar. 1999 and Aug. 1999) [hereinafter
Martin Interview].
5Tissue Banks International (TBI) and the Doheny Eye Bank, which serve Los Angeles,
have been criticized by former employees, ethicist, and investigative news programs like 20/20
and the L.A. TiMas for their eagerness to increase supply of cornea tissue, sometimes without
regard for family consent, health factors or social criteria which would restrict certain comeas
from entering the stream of supply. Id.
55
See Cornea Research Interview Notes and Transcripts (on file with author). Interviews
were conducted with directors of eye banks representing Wisconsin, Kentucky, Arkansas,
northern Florida, Michigan, Illinois, northern Ohio, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and New Orleans. Attempts were made to interview eye bank
representatives or directors representing Georgia, California, Maryland, Texas, and Minnesota.
But see Williams Interview I, supra note 49; Interview with Mary Jane ONeil, Executive
Director of Eye Bank Sight Restoration in New York. Both O'Neil and Williams support
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consent policies with effective
56
experience surpluses in donation.

educational

programming

also

PART IMI. UNDERSTANDING LEGISLATIVE (OR PRESUMED) CONSENT

Consent, an essential moral and ethical principle in organ donation, has
nevertheless been perceived as problematic in the mass procurement of
organs. 57 The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) failed to
clarify key issues with regard to consent, 58 one of which was connected
to autopsies and coroner authority. 59 The Act did not offer a model to
presumed consent laws and believe that it would greatly benefit their states. Neither state
tissues.
presently
56 uses legislative consent to procure eye
See Cornea Research Interview Notes and Transcripts, supra note 54.
57Linda C. Fentiman, Organ Donation as National Service: A ProposedFederalOrgan
Donation Law, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1593, 1599 (proposing presumed consent system that
would avoid consent, and arguing that "physicians would no longer need to confront a grieving
family with the need to make a quick decision about organ donation"); Jaffe, supra note 24, at
535 (stating that "one significant barrier was perceived to be the difficulty of obtaining consent
for organ
58 donation").
See Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VRINIA L. REv. 1015, 1016,
1016 n. 14 (1985)[hereinafter Sale of Human Organs];Note, Regulating The "Gift of Life'The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 65 WASH. L. REv. 171, 176 (1990) [hereinafter
The Gift ofLife].
Regulating
59
UAGA (1968) 7(d) ("The provisions of this Act are subject to the laws of the state
prescribing powers and duties with respect to autopsies.").
The autopsy or medical examiner provisions are referred to as "legislative consent"
statutes by most of the eye bank directors interviewed in this study. The legislative consent
statutes operate through medical inquest or autopsy as discussed infra. Autopsies, while now
common, are mandatory only in certain circumstances. These laws operate through mandatory
medical examiner inquiry or investigation (as opposed to a family member requesting the
procedure). These statutes however refer to "autopsy" as the mandatory medical examiner
investigation. It should therefore not be confused with routine autopsies that a private
individual may request, but which the state is not investigating. See also Tax. HEALTH AND
SAFETY 693.012, the Texas statute authorizing legislative consent, reading in part:
Section 1. On a request from an authorized official of an eye bank for
corneal tissue, a justice of the peace or medical examiner may permit the
removal of corneal tissue if:
(1) the decedent from whom the tissue is to be taken died under
circumstances requiring an inquest by the justice of the peace or the
medical examiner;
(2) no objection by a person listed in Section 2 of this Act is known by the
justice of the peace or the medical examiner; and
(3) the removal of corneal tissue will not interfere with the subsequent
course of an investigation or autopsy, or alter the postmortem facial
appearance.
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address posthumous handling of human bodies or parts thereof. 60 Thus,
questions of organ sales or posthumous appropriation remained. 6 1 Each
state was left to its own interpretation of the conditions necessary to
compel state action on a corpse.62 While consent was important for
developing cultural trust in the donation and transplantation process, it
nonetheless has become perceived as an obstacle. 63 Jaffe noted that
consent "soon became a hindrance as the success of organ
transplantation increased."64
Others troubled by the consent
requirement argued that consent impedes the progress of organ
65
transplantation by limiting the number of organs made available.
Limited consent strategies were developed--both to address
methods for posthumous handling of the body and also to alleviate
tissue and organ shortage. Part III of this article attempts to educate the
reader about legislative consent policies, and the moral and ethical
issues that surround limited (or no) consent measures. Legislative
consent is presently used only with eyes, eye tissues, and corneas in the
United States, and only in fewer than a dozen states (although nearly
thirty states have laws authorizing the medical examiner to remove eyes
without consent).
However, some commentators, including Linda Fentiman, have
proposed organ donation as a national service, and support legislative
consent with the possibility of opting out.66 States that have adopted
60

See UAGA (1968) 7 (d).

61

In fact, the 1968 UAGA drew staunch criticism from commentators disappointed with its
ambiguities on organ retrieval without consent and organ sales. Jaffe, supra note 24, at 534 &
n. 30.
62
UAGA (1968) 7(d) (stating that the provisions of the UAGA are subject to the individual
laws of states prescribing powers and duties with regard to autopsies); Jaffe, supra note 24, at
534 ("the UAGA (1968) had no effect on the normal duties of the coroner, however, since the
Act was explicitly made subject to the existing state autopsy laws").
63
Fentiman, supra note 57, at 1599; Jaffe, supra note 24, at 535.
64Id.

65

Williams Interview II, supra note 50. Williams argues that donor registration is too
bureaucratic and that lives could be saved with legislative consent to harvest organs. See also
Mark F. Anderson, The Future of Organ Transplantation:From Where Will New Donors
Come, To Whom Will Their Organs Go, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 249, 258-70 (1995). Anderson
notes that one of the two claims made by proponents of presumed consent centers on
alleviating the burden of consenting to something which they otherwise would support, thereby
producing
"greater numbers of organs for transplantation." Id. at 259.
66
Fentiman, supra note 57.
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this model are presented with significant moral and ethical problems,
particularly since these laws operate through medical examiner
inquiries into homicides, trauma, poisonings, and deaths that happen
disproportionately in urban and poor communities. 67 Only a few courts
have addressed the legality of these state statutes because so few cases
have been brought to challenge such laws. 68 According to Mark
Larson, Executive Director of the Eyebank of Wisconsin, some of the
reasons for this might be the fact that people are generally unaware of
presumed consent statutes in their states, and the fact that it is difficult
to detect when corneas have been removed. 69 Presumed consent
presents too many moral and ethical problems to justify its use, even
under a social contract analysis as discussed in Parts III and IV of this
article.
Of the fifteen eye bank directors or administrative staff
interviewed for this study only three shared the opinion that the benefits
of legislative consent policies outweighed obtaining donor consent, or
70
for that matter, collecting medical history.

67
Anderson, supra note 65, at 268 (discussing the purpose of autopsies to investigate the
purpose of death and that state statutes authorize medical examiners to perform such inquiries
without consent for "non-homicidal traumatic death" and "suspected homicides"). However,
relatively little scholarly attention has been given to presumed consent and its impact on fragile
communities (the poor, urban, of color, homeless, etc.).
68Jaffe, supra note 24, at 538.
69
Larson Interview, supra note 53.
70
Those interviewed include: Mary Jane O'Neil, Executive Director, Eye Bank Sight
Restoration (New York, N.Y.); Florence Johnston, President & CEO, Midwest Eye Bank

(Mich.); Tom Buckley, Executive Director, New England Eye and Tissue Transplant Bank
(Boston, Mass.); Donica Davis, Hospital Development Coordinator, Tennessee Eye Bank;
Mark Larson, Executive Director, The Eyebank of Wisconsin (Madison, Wis.); Dr. Jim Martin,
Executive Director of Louisville Eye Bank (Louisville, Ky.); Gene Reynolds, Technical
Director, Alabama Eye Bank; Kristen McCoy, Laboratory Director Illinois Eye Bank; Maurice
Van Zance, Executive Director, Indiana Transplant Program; Chey Greiger, Administrator,
Southern Eye Bank (New Orleans, La.); Doyce Williams, Executive Director, Alabama Eye
Bank; David Sierra, Hospital Development Technical Director, North Florida Lions Eye Bank
(Jacksonville, Fla.). Interviews were also conducted with representatives from Tissue Banks
International (Md.) and The Eye Bank Association of America. Attempts were made to
interview eye bank officials in California and Washington, D.C.; however, calls made in
February and March (2000) were not returned. A concerted effort was made to interview
officials from states with legislative consent provisions.
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Definitions & New Directions
In an effort to procure organs that otherwise would not have been
donated, two donation models have developed: legislative consent, also
referred to as presumed consent; and "reasonable efforts to obtain
consent." 71 Legislative consent basically assumes legislative authority
71

UAGA (1987) 4. Unlike most presumed consent laws, the UAGA (1987) applies to all
organs. However, unlike traditional presumed consent laws, a reasonable effort to allow for
consent is encouraged in the statute. Section 4(a)(2) requires that the medical examiner "make a
reasonable effort... to locate and examine the decedent's medical records and inform the next
of kin." Nevertheless, enforcement of this provision seems difficult to monitor and
Frammolino's investigation discussed in the Introduction illuminates the fact that requests are
not always pursued prior to tissue harvesting. See Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas,supra note
3. Note, however, that California, the state in question, both adopted the UAGA (1987) and has
presumed consent legislation. See also State of Wisconsin Statutes 157.06 Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act (relevant portion):
(4) Authorization By Coroner or Medical Examiner.
(a) The Coroner or medical examiner may release and permit the removal
of a part from, a decedent within that official's custody, for transplantation
or therapy, if all of the following apply:
(1) The official has received a request for the part of the body from a
hospital, physician or procurement organization.
(2) The official has made a reasonable effort, taking into account the useful
life of the part of the body, to locate and examine the decedent's medical
records and inform individuals listed in sub. (3)(a) of their option to make,
or object to making, an anatomical gift.
(3) The official does not know of a refusal or contrary indication by the
decedent or of an objection by an individual having priority to act as listed
in sub. (3)(a)
(4) The removal will be by a physician, except that in the case of eyes, by a
physician or by an enucleator.
(5) The removal will not interfere with any autopsy or investigation.
(6) The removal will be in accordance with accepted medical standards.
(7) Cosmetic restoration will be done to the decedent's body, if appropriate.
(b) An official releasing, and permitting the removal of a part of, a human
body shall maintain a permanent record of the name of the decedent, the
name of the person making the request, the date and purpose of the request,
the part of the body requested and the name of the person to whom it was
released.
Wisconsin has a typical autopsy law with the following provisions:
The following deaths occurring at Wisconsin hospitals must be reported to
the coroner:
a. All deaths in which there are unexplained, unusual, or suspicious
circumstances
b. All homicides.
c. All suicides.
d. All deaths following an abortion.
e. All deaths due to poisoning, whether homicidal, suicidal, or accidental.
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over a corpse that appears before the medical examiner, justice of the
72
peace, or coroner, pursuant to a mandatory autopsy or investigation.
Required request is a provision related to presume consent that allows
for nonconsensual removal of body parts, but requires that an effort be
made to contact the decedent's nearest relative for consent prior to
organ harvesting.73 Metaphorically, the consent process happens in two
spheres: first, the legislature authorizes the coroner to remove the
tissue; then coroner authorizes release of the tissue for particular
purposes.
Both models have yet to fulfill the legislative expectations and
increase in organ procurement that was hoped for over fifteen years
ago. They also further exacerbate the tension surrounding organ
donation by compounding the shortfall in organ and tissue supply with
uneasily resolvable moral and ethical problems. 74 Is it ethical to
remove one's eyes or other tissues without obtaining prior consent from
the donor? How does a homeless person opt-out? Can the legislature
have final authority over one's body? Obviously, it can with regard to
criminal prosecutions. Indeed, capital punishment is authorized through
state legislation and involves taking the life of another. And yet,
legislative consent, for purposes of donation, is different; its purpose is

f. All deaths following accidents (of any kind) whether the injury is or is

not the primary cause of death.
g. When there was no physician, or accredited practitioner of a bona fide

religious denomination relying upon prayer or spiritual means for healing
in attendance within 30 days preceding death.
h. When a physician refuses to sign the death certificate.
When, after reasonable efforts, a physician cannot be obtained to sign the
medical verification as required under Section 69.18 (2)(b) or (c) of the
Wisconsin Statutes within 6 days after the pronouncement of death or
sooner under circumstances which the coroner or medical examiner
determines to be an emergency.
72
See
supra note 59.
73
Jaffe, supra note 24, at 537 & n.41.
74
Larson Interview, supra note 53. Larson strongly opposes legislative consent. In our
interview, he emphasized the moral and potential health risks involved in procuring and
transplanting tissues without consent and communication with families. He acknowledges that
autopsies will generally destroy corneas (because they are pierced to retrieve vitreous fluid),
and that the physical impairment is less offensive than the immorality of taking something so
intimate and personal off of someone's family member. Id.
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not to punish, but rather to give the gift of sight, according to Doyce
75
Williams.

Eye Bank Directors Speak Out: Is Legislative Consent Ethical?
Both legislative consent and requirements for reasonable efforts to
obtain consent effectively operate to reduce or remove donor authority
to grant consent prior to harvesting of body parts, with legislative
consent being the more extreme of the two. 7 6 First, legislative consent,
developed initially in Maryland with the passage of its presumed
consent law in 1975, 77 and passed in twenty-eight states7 8 (with nine
75

Williams Interview, supra note 65.
Phyllis Coleman, "Brother Can You Spare a Liver?" Five Ways to Increase Organ
Donation, 31 VAL. U.L. Rnv. 1, 18 (1996) (commenting that "presumed consent represents a
more extreme proposal than required request").
77See 40509.1 (1982 Md, Laws Section 2 ch. 73; 1982, ch. 770 4). Titled: When Chief
Medical Examiner or his deputy or assistant may provide cornea transplant, describes the
statutory requirements and provisions for legislative consent:
(a) Requirements-In any case where a patient is in need of comeal tissue
for a transplant, the Chief Medical Examiner, the deputy chief medical
examiner, or an assistant medical examiner may provide the comea upon
the request of the Medical Eye Bank of Maryland, Incorporated under the
following conditions:
(1) The medical examiner has charge of a decedent who may provide a
suitable cornea for transplant;
(2) An autopsy will be required;
(3) No objection by the next of kin is known by the medical examiner; and
(4) Removal of the comea for transplant will not interfere wit the
subsequent course of an investigation or autopsy or alter the postmortem
facial appearance.
(b) Liability of Medical Examiner.-The Chief Medical Examiner, the
deputy chief medical examiner, an assistant medical examiner, and the
Medical Eye Bank of Maryland, Incorporated are not liable for civil action
if the next of kin subsequently contends that authorization of that kin was
required.
7
"ARmz. REv. STAT. ANN. 36-851 to -852 (1986 & Supp.1989); ARK. CODE ANN. 12-12320 (1987); CAL. Gov'T CODE 27491.46-.47 (West 1988); COLO. REv. STAT. 30-10-621
(1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 19a-281 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, 4712
(Supp.1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. 732.9185 (West Supp.1989); GA. CODE ANN. 31-23-6 (1985);
HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. 327-4 (1988); IDAHO CODE 39-3405 (Supp.1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110 1/2, 351-354 (Smith-Hurd Supp.1989); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 311.187 (Michie
Supp.1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:2354.1-3, 33:1565 (West 1982, 1988 & Supp.1989); MD.
EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. 4-509.1 (Supp.1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 113, 14 (Law.Coop.Supp.1989); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. 333.10202 (1989); MISS. CODE ANN. 41-61-71
(Supp.1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. 58.770 (Vernon 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. 72-17-215 (1989);
N.C. GEN. STAT. 130A-391 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE 23-06.2-04 (Supp.1989); Omo REv.
76
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states actively using the law)79 operates in a shroud of secrecy; very few
people are aware of these laws. 80 The second measure is found in the
1987 UAGA, containing a "reasonable effort to obtain consent ' 8'
provision, which closely resembles an "opt-out model. 8 2 Drafters of
these provisions were hopeful that organ procurement would increase
enough to meet a demand that, by the nineteen eighties (1980s), had
grown exponentially.
In practice, however, the two provisions have been problematic
and not the best solutions for increasing organ and tissue
procurement. 83 According to Dr. Jim Martin, Executive Director of the
Louisville Eye Bank in Kentucky, legislative consent was not
successful in his state and annual deficits were experienced until they
changed their procurement strategies and stopped operating under
presumed consent.8 4 Perhaps one reason for Kentucky's inability to
meet demand under legislative consent was that the policy failed to
garner the support of medical professionals and the eye bank
community, and thus was not consistently or effectively applied. 85
CODE ANN. 2108.60 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, 944.1 (West Supp.1990); R.I.
GEN. LAWS 23-18.6-4 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. 68-30-204 (Supp.1989); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. 693.012 (Vernon pamphlet 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. 26-4-23 (1989);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 68.50.280 (Supp.1989); Wis. LAWS 157.06 (1989); W.VA. CODE 1619-3a (1985).
79
California, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, North
Carolina, and Wiscorisin.
85See Butgeriet, Cornea Controversy,supra note 40 (commenting that "Jefferson County
[Alabama] isn't alone in wrestling over whether medical examiners should be allowed to
remove corneas of dead people without their families' permission or knowledge"); Frammolino,
L.A. Coroner,supra note 40 (citation omitted) (reporting that eye bank employees "say they
were discouraged from seeking family permission so corneas could be harvested under state
law").
81
Jaffe, supra note 24, at 535-38.
82
0pt-out models presume that a person is willing to consent to donation of her tissue
unless 83
she makes her wishes known to the contrary. Id. at 536 & n.36.
Martin Interview, supra note 53; Larson Interview, supra note 53; Telephone interview
with David Sierra, Hospital Development Technical Director for North Florida Lions Eye Bank
(Feb. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Sierra Interview] (commenting that legislative consent "can't tell
you what a person was doing at 4:00 am the morning prior"); Telephone interview with Kristen
McCoy, Laboratory Director, Illinois Eye Bank, (Feb. 21, 2000) [hereinafter McCoy Interview]
(commenting that they do not use the Illinois legislative consent statute because of a fear of law
suits and
ethical considerations).
4
8 Martin Interview, supra note 53.

85d.
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In two interviews in Kentucky, and in subsequent conversations,
Dr. Martin explained that the legislative consent policy was simply
morally unacceptable and fraught with ethical and potential legal
problems. 86 The problems ranged from quality of donor tissue to the
possible overrepresentation of tissues harvested from young, poor black
kids. 87 Therefore, the Kentucky medical community sought alternative
solutions. 88 Other eye bank officials, including Mark Larson, 89 Donica
Davis, Hospital Division Coordinator for the Tennessee Eye Bank, and
Tom Buckley, Executive Director of The New England Eye and Tissue
Transplant Bank, 90 complained about similar issues. At an interview in
his Madison, Wisconsin office, Larson shared concerns quite similar to
those addressed by Martin, including the idea that a sufficient supply
"of transplantable corneas can only be obtained through effective
hospital development and donor awareness programs" 91 and not
through "shortcuts. 9 2 In an opinion paper, Larson indicates that
experience with social history interviews with families of donors
provides necessary information that is not required under the legislative
consent policy.93 Beyond the supply94issue, consent, according to
Larson, is simply "the right thing to do."
86

1d. Dr. Martin suggested that Kentucky legislators adopted that states measure in

response to the enactment of similar provisions by other state legislatures, and to strong
lobbying efforts at both the state and federal levels by eye banks supporting legislative consent
measures. Id. Ohio, Arkansas, and West Virginia, all border or region states with Kentucky,
adopted similar statutes a year or two before Kentucky. Compare KY. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
311.187(1988); OHiO Rv. CODE ANN. 2108.60 (1987); ARK. CODE ANN. 12-12-320 (1987);
W.VA. CODE 16-19-3A (1985).
87
Martin Interview, supra note 83.
881d.
89

Larson Interview, supra note 53 (stating that "not having consent is a bad thing. One

bad thing can undue many things"); Telephone interview with Donica Davis, Hospital
Development Coordinator, Tennessee Eye Bank, (Apr. 5, 2000) [hereinafter Davis Interview]
(commenting that "we also want consent from the family"); Telephone interview with Tom
Buckley, Executive Director of New England Eye and Tissue Transplant Bank (Apr. 6, 2000)
[hereinafter Buckley Interview] (stating that, "philosophically, we have felt that, isn't it better to
contact the families? for courtesy if nothing else?").
90
Buckley Interview, supra note 89; Larson Interview, supra note 53; Davis Interview,
supra note 89.
9

lLarson Interview, supra note 53.
Id.

92

93 Mark E. Larson, Use of Tissue Recovered Using Medical Examiner/CoronerLaws

(Mar. 5,94 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author.).
Id.
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Doyce Williams, however, is quick to point out that legislative
consent "works" when done consistently. For example, the State of
Alabama experienced annual surpluses in the supply of transplantable
corneas until lawmakers abandoned legislative consent laws.95 But can
success be measured against a loss of community trust? Recent
newspaper headlines in Alabama convey a much different attitude
about legislative consent laws: "Cornea Controversy: Eye Banks Don't
See Eye To Eye" and "Mother Feels Corneas Were Stolen. 9 6 These
front-page news items illustrate the drama lurking behind consent laws
that operate in a vacuum, without donor or relative consent, or any
communication for that matter. These headlines came after
investigative reports revealed that corneas were being harvested in
Alabama, pursuant to state statute, without consent from the decedent's
relatives. In a case that made headlines and resulted in an out-of-court
settlement, a mother, Patsy Burton, learned about the medical
examiner's removal of her teenage son's corneas only after reading97news
reports about the nonconsensual harvesting of tissues in Alabama.
Angered at "not being given a chance" to give consent, Burton
wondered, "what else can they do, or what do they do, when they have
the chance?" 98 In a letter to the county commissioner, she asked, "did
the coroner's office take my son's corneas because they were trying to
help someone else see again or just because he was young and they
thought nobody would care?" 99 According to Doyce Williams, the
fallout from the negative publicity had a chilling affect on altruistic
donations 0 0 and led to the abrupt
abandonment of the legislative
10 1
lawmakers.
by
provision
consent
95
Williams Interview, supra note 65. Mr. Williams proffered that more people had their
vision restored under legislative consent laws, and they were able to export excess corneal

tissue. However, the state has suffered a dramatic decrease in the amount of tissues available
since the abandonment of legislative consent laws, the emergence of bad publicity, and
lawsuits. Id.
96Butgereit, Controversy, supra note 40; Betsy Butgereit, Mother Feels Corneas Were
Stolen, BiMINHAM Nmvs (Alabama), Feb. 16, 1998, at Al [hereinafterMother Feels].
97
See Butgereit, MotherFeels, supra note 96.
9
81d.
99
Id.
""0Williams Interview, supra note 65 (commenting on the affect of negative publicity on
cornea procurement).
°1'Karin Meadows, Cornea Policy OK By Commissioners, BimNGHA

NEws
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Thus, at what cost to community trust do such programs operate?
In California, nonconsensual cornea harvesting caused community
outrage and forced the Los Angeles County coroner's office to respond
to the reports of "ethical breaches" by no longer "routinely permitting a
local eye bank to harvest corneas without the permission or knowledge
of surviving family members.' 0 2 Accordingly, organ and tissue
10 3
procurement should not be viewed as simply a numbers game.
Granted, saving lives, and restoring sight is important, but possibly at
the cost of donor autonomy and community health.
Mary Jane ONeil, a legislative consent proponent, notes that, "ten
years ago people who would have been donors have been saved by
seatbelt laws, helmet requirements, and gun control.' 0 4 However,
most Americans would probably agree that saving lives by restricting
certain behaviors that are known to cause injury or even death is a
"good thing to do,"'1 5 even if there are other Americans who would
(Alabama), Feb. 19, 1998 at B1. (noting that "the matter became the subject of controversy
after commissioners discovered the coroner's office wasn't obtaining permission to remove the
dime-sized clear tissue for transplants"). After the series of news articles chronicling Patsy
Burton's misfortune, the Jefferson County Commissioner's office now requires that the
Alabama Eye Bank make efforts to contact the next of kin. See Williams Interview, supra note
53.
' 02Frammolino, L.A. Coroner,supra note 40 (citation omitted).
103But see Interview with Mary Jane ONeil, Executive Director, Eye Bank Sight
Restoration in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 21, 2000) [hereinafter O'Neil Interview]. Reconciling the
need to restore sight and promote life by violating a dead body can be a clear-cut case for some.
O'Neil lobbied for a medical examiner statute in New York, believing that it would increase the
number of corneas available for transplantation, and that eventually "80% of people would care
less." Id.
1'M4d. See also Fentiman, supra note 57, at 1594 n.6 (citing END STATE RENAL DISEASE
FOUNDATION HEALTH CARE FINANCING RESEARCH REPORT

(1990)) (commenting that "recent

changes in both the law and public attitudes toward seat belt use and drinking and driving,
along with broad demographic trends, have combined to decrease the pool of available
donors").
105Erica Noonan, Sprinkler Bill Stirs Some Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 25, 2001 at 3
(commenting that "safety prevention efforts save lives, noting its no different than saying it
costs money to install seat belts and air bags and baby cars seats .... There are things we spend
money on, and saving lives seems like a pretty good thing to spend money on"). See also
Charles Wheelen, Lives ChangedIn a Split Second, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, at A 19; Licia
Corbella, Don't Put Children Near FrontAir Bags, TE CALGARY SUN, Mar. 16, 2001, at 4;
Lori Shontz, Healing Rock: Process of Moving on after Earnhardt's Death Begins, N.C.,
PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, Feb. 25, 2001, at DI; Meredith Fischer and Will Jones, Some
Roads are Deadly: Deficient Design, Driver Inattention Can Be FatalMix, RICHMOND TIMES
DISPATCH (Virginia), at Al.
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benefit from their corneas, kidneys, and other potential remains.
Besides, the vision of a revolving door of people with poor behaviors
dying only to supply their biological remains to those with less risky
behaviors seems a bit macabre. Should only the safe-acting, less-riskybehaving be promised restoration of their vision or the gift of life?
Should only those who are victims of others unsafe behaviors comprise
the donor pool?
Religious Concerns
Other ethical problems are posed by the legislative authorization to
waive consent to autopsy and tissue harvesting. Certain cultural
expectations and religious doctrines emphasize human dignity, the
sacredness of the body, and preservation of life, even when medically
the body may be considered "dead. 10 6 For example, Orthodox Judaism
places a strong emphasis on life.10 7 According to Elliot Dorff, a
philosopher as well as a rabbi, Jewish law "requires that Jews take steps
to preserve their life and health," even when secular law and medical
practice might have determined death. 10 8
Strong Judaic values associated with life pose difficulty for
"agreeing to donate."' 1 9 Moreover, the connection to the spiritual
afterlife, and the belief in the existence after death of "spirits who look
like the embodied people they were in life," is attributed to making the
more conservative members of the Jewish faith reluctant to grant
consent to donate. 10 It stands to reason, if a religious tenet, a belief in
the sacredness of the body, and an uncertainty about when death occurs
presently inhibit some Jews from voluntarily consenting to organ
16

Elliot N. Dorff, ChoosingLife: Aspects ofJudaismAffecting Organ Transplantation,IN

ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS AND REAuTIES, supra note 31, at 168-93.
'0 71d at 177. Elliot Dorff comments that, "from [his] own perspective, the value of saving

lives ultimately overcomes objections to organ transplantation per se." Id. at 169. Dorff

acknowledges, however, that organ donation is a complicated issue in Judaism because death is
perceived as "extended over several phases, and [Judaism] has a basic diffidence with regard to
our ability to define the moment of death exactly." Id at 177. "Still," he writes, "deeply human
factors shape our understanding of our bodies and of the divine image in which we are all
created, and transplantation efforts must preserve the dignity and respect that God's creation
demands." Id. at 169.
...
Id.at 177.
'091d. at 177-78.
"Od. at 178.
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donation, certainly a compulsory system, where no consent is required,
would be considered offensive.1 1 Indeed, Mary Jane O'Neil alluded to
as
much in an interview earlier this year.112 According to O'Neil,
"Jewish
people would not donate and would fight [presumed
consent]"' "1 3 for the reasons suggested by Elliot Dorff and other
commentators.
Proponents of legislative consent argue that those with religious
objections can "opt-out" of consent, meaning that they can make known
or register their refusal to donate.1 14 Although opt-outs might be
available, they are often more illusory than real.1 15 First, many people
are not aware of the existence of presumed or legislative consent
policies. 1 6 Second, even if people were made aware of their rights,
many are skeptical as to whether and how the opt-out provisions would
7
be enforced."
An extensive Los Angeles Times investigative report in which
records from over 500 presumptive consent removal cases from a
period in 1996 to 1997 were reviewed, suggests that most people are
unaware that these laws exist. 118 The Los Angeles Times reporter
handling the investigation interviewed numerous families who
indicated their unawareness of the law, and were devastated to learn
that their children, husbands, and daughters had their corneas removed

1'Mackenzie Carpenter, "Presumed"Donor Bill Aired, PrrrsBtGH PosT-GAzEirE, July
14, 1999, at A10 (raising questions about the constitutionality of proposed presumed consent
measures because for "Native Americans, Orthodox Jews and most Asian religions,
disemboweling the body is a sacrilege"); James Lindemann Nelson, TransplantationThrough
A Glass Darkly, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP. No. 5, AT 6 (1992); ELLIOT PINSLEY, Routine
Donation of Organs Pushed; Ethics Group Seeks Presumed Consent, TBE REcoRD, Dec. 22,
1992 at Al (noting the fear among Orthodox Jews that presumed consent measures would be
problematic and "that a government bureaucracy cannot be trusted to maintain proper
records").
2
1 0'Neil Interview, supra note 103.
13
1 1d. O'Neil argued that the Jewish community organized and fought against legislative
consent in New York and her organization, which lobbied to support a medical examiner
statute, withdrew their proposal. Id.
" 4Pinsley, supra note 111 (commenting on James Nelson's presumed consent proposal,
which "specified that people could opt not to have their organs removed if they objected on
religious or philosophical grounds").
1156See Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas, supra note 3.
1

Id.

1'7 See Frammolino, L.A. Corner,supra note 40.
" 8Frammolino, Harvest ofCorneas, supra note 3.
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without consent or the effort to obtain consent. 119 Two recent surveys
conducted for this article revealed that over ninety percent (90%) of
survey participants in states with limited consent laws are unaware that

these laws exist.1 20

One of the groups surveyed consisted of

administrators in the Mayor's Office and members of the City Council
of Lexington, Kentucky. 12 1 Only one of fifteen people surveyed in this
group had heard about presumed consent, although Kentucky
22
authorized the legislation over ten years ago.1
In addition to lack of awareness arises the question of whether
opting out would work. Because timing is critically important to organ
and tissue harvesting, the necessity to transplant in a timely manner

might supercede waiting for a possible objection, particularly when the
most viable tissues require harvesting within three to six hours after

death. James Nelson's commentary on presumed consent and opt-out
measures illuminates important ethical concerns:
A simple reliance on our moral intuitions isn't enough. As the history of
medical research in the nineteenth and even twentieth century reveals,
we have been more than will to subject those who were "clearly less
valuable" to the rigors of research only then, the ones who were
obviously less valuable were Jewish, or people of color. Our gut
instincts simply aren't good enough as reliable moral guides when we're

119

d.
120Michele Goodwin, Organ TransplantSurvey Analysis (Feb. 16, 2000)(unpublished, on
file with the author). The surveys were conducted over the phone in late January and February
2000. The author asked eleven questions of each participant. Of the initial one hundred surveys
analyzed, the race groupings were eighty-six percent (86%) African American and fourteen
percent (14%) White. Participants ranged in age from 18-70 years old. Sixty-five percent (65%)
of the participants were 18-25 years old.
One survey was administered to 15 local government officials in Lexington, Kentucky,
with the assistance of Janet Givens, special assistant to Mayor Pam Miller. The other survey
was administered to one hundred participants through phone interviews. The participants were
randomly selected from lists of names obtained from community leaders, clergy, college
students, and community advocates. Participants were from Kentucky, Arkansas, Maryland,
Alabama, Tennessee, and North Carolina.
Only one of the fifteen people (or 6.6%) surveyed in the Mayor's Office was aware of
presumed consent laws in Kentucky. Of the larger group surveyed, only five of the one hundred
people2 (5%) had ever heard of presumed consent laws.
1
1 1d.
2

' 21d. See also KY. Ray. STAT. ANN. 311.187 (1988).
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dealing with
those whom we've pushed to the margin of moral
123
discourse.

You Vang Yang v. Sturner, the closest case on point, illustrates the
difficulty with opting out of autopsies.1 24 The Yangs, members of the
Hmong community, adhere to the religious doctrines of the Hmongs,
"one of which prohibits any mutilation of the body, including autopsies
or the removal of organs during an autopsy."' 125 The Yangs brought an
action for damages after an autopsy was performed on their son,
claiming that the Rhode Island autopsy statute, both facially and as
applied by the medical examiner, violated their first amendment right to
exercise their religion freely, and their fourteenth amendment rights to
due process and equal protection. 126 The court held that the couple's
exercise of religious beliefs against mutilation of a body was clearly
established, and denied Sturner's qualified immunity defense. In
reaching its decision for the plaintiffs, the court opined that a medical
examiner should know the law governing his conduct. 127 Although the
123Nelson, supra note 111, at 7-8 (proposing a presumed consent measure with opt-out
provisions the same year his article was published).
124You Vang Yang v. Sturner,728 F.Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1990).
'25ld.
at 846.
12 61d. at 847. The Yang's twenty-three-year-old son died from a seizure, but physicians
involved with the case were unaware of what caused the seizure, and thus an autopsy was
recommended
and performed. Id. at 846.
12 71d. at 853. Yang and its progeny are instructive on this point. The Yang trial judge felt
compelled to reverse himself after the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Employment Div., Dept of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Yang v.
Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
In Smith, the Supreme Court held that "generally applicable, religion-neutral laws
that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a
compelling state interest." Id. at 887 n.3. However, under Congressional enactment of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq. (2000), state
infringement or burden of religious exercise will be strictly scrutinized. States must
demonstrate a compelling interest, and try to achieve that interest or goal through the least
restrictive means. Indeed, the Smith case was criticized by members of Congress as having
created an atmosphere in which unburdened expression of religious beliefs was jeopardized.
See Federal Document Clearing House CongressionalTestimony, June 23, 1999, CAPrrOL
HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, TESTIMONY JUNE 23, 1999 RUSELL D. FEINGOLD SENATOR SENATE
JUDICIARY PROTECTING REUGIOUS LIBERTY (testifying about his discontent with the Supreme
Courts Decision in Smith. "I voted for the original Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
in 1993 because I thought that the Supreme Court made a mistake in 1990 in the Smith case, in
effect reducing the level of protection against government intrusion that religious expression in
this country receives from the courts"). See also Mark Chaves and William Tsitos, Are
Congregations Constrained by Government? Empirical Results from the National
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court initially granted relief, there is some question about whether or
not its actions would have been different were the autopsy performed
and organs or tissue used for transplantation. Moreover, the case
illustrates how one can find out too late to opt-out, at which point a
perception that a sons or
legal victory may pale in comparison to the
12 8
daughter's soul is doomed to eternal unrest.
Safety Concerns: Collecting Social Histories
Several eye bank procurement officials cautioned about the quality of
presumed consent tissue, noting that tissue and organs might not be
"high quality" or "safe" because communicable diseases such as
hepatitis B and C, rabies, and Creutzfeldt-Jakob syndrome (similar to
mad cow disease) can be transmitted through comeas. 129 Their
concerns arise from the loose, if any, health requirements of presumed
consent donors. According to Mark Larson, presumed consent statutes
do not mandate that social histories be obtained. 130 He states that social

CongregationsStudy, 42 J. CHURCH & STATE 335 [hereinafter Congregations Study](quoting
members of Congress disturbed by the Smith decision. Rep. Maloney from New York, for
instance, stated that the fundamental right of all Americans to the free exercise of religion is in
serious jeopardy .... "The Supreme Court's ruling in Smith has already begun to chip away at
the first freedom protected by the Bill of Rights, the freedom of religion"). Representative
Franks of New Jersey was also outspoken about the Smith decision. Id. Franks suggested that
the implications of the Smith decision are especially burdensome for those whose beliefs lie
within the religious minority. Id. But see City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507; 117 S. Ct.
2157 (1997) (holding RFRA unconstitutional and overly intrusive in states authority to regulate
for the health and safety of its citizens and impinges upon principles necessary to further
separation between church and state). Professor Drinan of Georgetown University Law School,
however, suggests that the future is unclear if RFRA is not reinstated in some form. The
problem is that no one will ever know. At the local level, zoning commissions will quietly deny
access to Jewish temples, controversial denominations, or Catholic schools. See Congregations
Study, supra note 127, at 335.
'1Scholars also suggest that religious conflicts with presumed consent may have less to
do with opposition to performing a loving and kind act that would benefit another, or even
sharing human organs, but more to do with human dignity. The major obstacle is the perception
of bodily harm or mutilation caused by the actual removal of organs. Philosophically, this view
challenges the notion that a "dead body" is simply a corpse, no longer able to support feelings,
emotions, thoughts, and therefore lacking a certain integrity or humanity that is deemed
exclusively for the living. Rather, a profound respect for the deceased seems to drive religious
doctrines that oppose compulsory organ harvesting.
Interview, supra note 53.
129Larson
1301d.
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history is usually provided through an interview with a family member
or doctor.131
Larson explains that eye banks in Wisconsin do not recover tissue
using the presumed consent legislation because "experience with next
of kin [social] history interviews suggest that unique information is
collected that is only available from this source."'132 The uniqueness of
that information, he argues, allows him and his staff to make more
appropriate determinations regarding issues of safety and suitability of
tissue. 133 Accordingly, it would seem that increased collection of any
donor information related to risk factors for infectious
disease will
1 34
reduce the risk of infectious disease transplantation.
In most presumed consent cases, obtaining social histories presents
certain obstacles. First, it requires communicating with survivors, who
might opt-out of donating their relative's organs. Second, given the
lifestyles of some presumed consent donors, they may not have
survivors who can easily be contacted. Moreover, they may be part of a
questionable health pool (drug users, have criminal histories, etc.).
Frammolino's 1997 investigation of the Los Angeles coroner's office
revealed that several pairs of corneas harvested for transplantation were
from individuals who had been incarcerated (a donor pool considered
not acceptable for transplantation by California's own eye bank
community). 135 Furthermore, who does one contact to obtain the social
history of a homicide victim with no driver's license? Presumed consent
presents too many health unknowns.
Obtaining social histories may be somewhat antithetical to
presumed consent procurement philosophy and strategies. As an
Indiana official observed, "if you get their social history, you might as
well obtain consent.' 36 The purpose for these policies is to increase
tissue procurement by avoiding consent obstacles, which the framers of
the 1987 UAGA perceived as the significant problem in organ
3

1

lid.

132Larson, supra note 93, at 2.
33
1 1d.
134

1d.
135 Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas,supra note

3.
Telephone interview with Maurice Van Zance, Executive Director of the Indiana Eye
Bank (Feb. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Van Zance Interview].
13 6
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procurement.1 37 Thus, according to Jim Martin, obtaining social
as a selfhistories, a policy that he supports, might be perceived
38
proponents.
consent
defeating measure to presumed
OvercomingRacialPerceptions
Can an increased yield in biological materials justify the potential racial
and socio-economic imbalances in the donor pools, particularly when
those communities are less than likely to be recipients? Eye bank
officials from Kentucky, Wisconsin, and Michigan expressed concern
about the potential for an overrepresentation of young men of color to
have homicide deaths before the coroner, and thus subject to mandatory
autopsy or investigation. 3 9 Arguably, this would be a more relevant
issue in urban communities where there are significant populations of
people of color. However, Jim Martin of Kentucky suggested that such
laws could also create disparities with racial impacts in
smaller urban
40
communities like Lexington and Louisville, Kentucky.
Nonetheless, in New York, Los Angeles, Washington D.C.,
Baltimore, and Atlanta, presumed consent can have a devastating
impact.14 1 Presumed consent laws appear to be racially neutral on their
face; in that way they do not target communities of color. However, as
applied, they disproportionately affect people of color because blacks
and latinos may be more likely to die by violent deaths (most
are
homicides) than whites and most cases before medical examiners
1 42
homicides or violent deaths, followed by trauma-induced deaths.
In a Los Angeles study, for example, seventy-two percent (72%) of
the autopsies performed were on homicide victims. Accident victims,
the next largest group, accounted for sixteen percent (16%). 14 The
study also revealed that over eighty percent (80%) of those autopsied

7
'"t38
Jaffe, supra note 24, at 532-37.

Martin Interview, supranote 53.

139Martin Interview, supra note 53; Larson Interview supra note 53; Telephone

interview with Florence Johnston, President & CEO, Midwest Eyebank (Apr. 6, 2000)
[hereinafter
Johnston Interview].
140Martin Interview, supranote 53.
141See, e.g., Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas,supra note 3.
1421d.
143id "
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(and who became involuntary tissue donors), were black and latino.' 44
Only sixteen percent (16%) were white.'45 Thus, based on trends of
death, gang violence, drug culture, and a host of other social problems
that seem more concentrated in urban environments, it is not
unforeseeable that legislative consent would disproportionately affect
people of color, particularly youth and young adults. Frammolino, an
investigative reporter for the L.A. Times, points out that the average age
of those who legislatively "donated" was 27.7 years; according to his
study, this is "much younger" than the average age of death.' 6
Given the potential for extreme racial disparities, legislative
consent appears difficult to justify. Moreover, presumed consent would
further exacerbate the distinct racial problems presently associated with
organ allocation and transplantation.
PART IV. CAN PRESUMED CONSENT BE JUSTIFIED? COMMON LAW,
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE,

& THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

A pound of man'sflesh, taken from a man, is not so
estimable, profitable neither, as flesh of muttons,
7
beefs, or goats.1 4
We give them a kinder, gentler death than they
deserve to mark a boundary between the "civilised'
and the "savage"...1 4 8
The philosophies of law, and of medicine, are
intimately bound to the mechanics of living, to
preserving and enhancing our stake in the world. The
issue of death remains peripheral to these
49
processes.1
14

41d.
51d.
146ld"

14

147 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE 18 (Yale University Press 1923)
(1600).

14 8 Austin Sarat, Killing Me Softly: Capital Punishment and the Technologies for
Taking Life, in COURTING DEATH, supra note 1, at 69 (citation omitted).
14 9 Melanie Williams, The Sanctity of Death: Poetry and the Law and Ethics of
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Under what theoretical framework could a policy such as legislative
consent be justified? It takes the form of a social and physical
obligation, ostensibly for a community good. And what higher moral
order could there be for a government than to support preserving and
saving life? Ethically it is clear that saving lives is a worthy and noble
humanitarian cause. Beyond being a "good cause," saving lives
functions under the auspices of obligations born upon the state for the
protection and safety of its communities. Indeed, why do governments
exist at all, if not to preserve, promote, and defend a community's
health and welfare?
Legislative consent is an example of a policy subsumed by mixed
moral considerations and obligations. One obligation is for the state to
preserve life and the health of its members. For this reason, Linda
Fentiman proposed organ donation as a national service. 150 Another
political obligation of a democratic society "is that the power of the
state [be] circumscribed, even if what the state wants to do is a good
thing."'151 Legislative consent creates a philosophical crossroad, where
opposing interests must be weighed for ultimate action that will result
in a justifiable and morally acceptable community benefit.
Politically and philosophically, presumed consent is perhaps best
justified through the social contract. It demonstrates how we can live in
what Rousseau referred to as the "chains" of civil society, while not
52
compromising core values or principles, including freedom.1
Through our relationships with the state are bom obligations that are
1 53
entered into involuntarily for the good of the common or whole.
Rousseau referred to these as general wills, in which the best interest of
a group is considered collectively, rather than individually. 154 Why
then would one choose to participate in the collective will if it means
assuming a political, economic, or social burden?

Euthanasia,in COURTING DEATH, supra note 1, at 88.
15VFentiman, supra note 34.
5
5'Pinsley, supra note 111 (quoting ethicist Robert Royal).
152

JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT 5

(Wordsworth
Classics 1998) (1762).
1
Id.

1d.at 14-16.
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People want to engage in the general will (as Americans have
done), when the exchange, or what is placed in return, affirms and
protects values freedom, political autonomy, and free expression and
customs. In this way the social contract is the operational and functional
equivalent of insurance - an investment in preserving financial, social,
and political order. However, the social contract works only if those
involved believe themselves to be members of that society and the
society in return grants them the benefits of membership and distributes
goods equitably. 155 However, membership cannot be defined as simply
physical placement. Slaves have historically been physically planted in
foreign societies, but have lacked membership. The same is true of
most foreigners; they are allowed physical space on foreign soil,
however the benefits of a society are not always bestowed upon
outsiders.
Does the social contract justify the use of present presumed
consent laws? Could it support legislative consent for organ
procurement? 156 As a moral justification to increase organ supply, by
nonconsensually taking organs, the social contract ultimately does not
work. Although social contract theory is perhaps the most persuasive
moral justification for taking a good from another for the benefit of the
whole, it cannot reconcile the disparities existing in the present system.
Arguably, the social contract works only when applied equitably and
distributive justice is achieved. Rousseau suggests that the basis for the
entire social system is a society's membership becoming "equal by
157
convention and legal right."'
Social compact theory ultimately fails to support the cause of
presumed consent, particularly in the case of those with an "othered" or
"outsider" existence. 58 Arguably, for America's disenfranchised

55

Id. at 15. Rousseau reduced the notion of the social contract to the idea that "each of
us puts in common his person and his whole power under the supreme direction of the general
will; and in return we receive every member as an indivisible part of the whole." Id.
156
See Anderson, supra note 65, at 262-68.
157RousSEAU, supra note 152, at 23.
158See CHARLES

W. MILLS, THE RAcIAL CONTRAcT (1997); Robin D.G. Kelley, Playing

for Keeps: Pleasure and Profit on the PostindustrialPlayground,in

THE

HousE THAT RACE

BUILT 195 (Wahneema Lubiano, ed. 1997) (arguing that America'has a racial contract, which
leaves blacks out and causes their exploitation).
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members, the social compact lacks legitimacy.1 5 9 The existence of a
social compact naturally depends on a demonstrable social contract,
where allocation is equitable and proportionate to resources derived
from a particular community. To this end, social compacts between the
disenfranchised with an "othered" American experience and the greater
community are legitimate only to the extent that the marginalized
groups have equitable access to and distribution of the goods claimed
by the larger community.
JurisprudentialAnalysis of Dead Bodies and the State
Jurisprudentsobserve that the legal order asserts
thatpeople are obligated,not just obliged to obey
the law.,Legal order, at least from a jurisprudential perspective, tends to suggest
an intimate, although perhaps not always desired association between
the community, property and the law. 161 Quasi-mandatory obligations
and responsibilities measure this relationship. In one's acquiescence to
the law is found a community good that becomes realized. At its liberal
utilitarian core, jurisprudential analysis reminds us that rights to a
particular "thing" are always conditioned upon governmental
necessity.
Accordingly, Andrew Beckerman-Rodau suggests the
purpose of this condition is to preserve the safety and health of the
163
greater populace.
In this basic concept, proponents of presumed consent justify the
nonconsensual appropriation of organs.164 However, their proposals
'See MILLs, supranote 158; Kelly, supra note 158.
,60C.

Edwin Baker, The Media That CitizensNeed, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 327 (1998).

161 d.

1621d.
163Andrew

Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the TraditionalDefinition of Property?
A JurisprudentialAnalysis,47 ARK. L. REv. 603, 607 (1994). But see Brotherton v. Cleveland,
923 F.2d 477, 481, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that "the only governmental interest enhanced
by the removal of the comeas is the interest in implementing the organ/tissue donation
program; this interest is not substantial enough to allow the state to consciously disregard those
property rights which it has granted").
'6Fentiman, supra note 34; Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Supplying Organs for
Transplantation,68 MICH. L. REv. 811 (1970); Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem
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disproportionately require something intimate and irreplaceable from
those most vulnerable because of their unchangeable social and cultural
status within the United States. As suggested earlier, those more likely
to be the donors under a traditional presumed consent law are people of
color and the urban poor. 165 While it is a laudable goal that Americans
share organs to improve the quality of life for others, placing the onus
of such policies on the most vulnerable, rather
than the most capable,
166
slavery.
of
reminiscent
and
seems inequitable
Rousseau characterizes slavery as the function of one (or a
community) alienating herself (or itself) by gift or sale. In the case 167
of
support.
of
means
for
exchange
in
herself
obligates
one
sales,
However, the gift scenario is absurd and "inconceivable" according to
Rousseau. 168
Why would any group give itself for nothing?
Accordingly, Rousseau argues the inconceivability of minority or
disenfranchised communities voluntarily alienating themselves for nonreciprocated benefits bestowed upon those with greater social status.
Moreover, Rousseau likens forced or involuntary servitude
disproportionately affecting those with minority status to a socially
unconscionable practice that resembles social madness.'6 9 Social
policies that unfairly burden a particular group are unjust at their very
core.
State Ownership ofBodies?
Consider, for example, that lawmakers do not require the wealthy to
share wealth in order to eliminate poverty. While it is true that estate
taxes help to fund programs that benefit the general population,
sometimes those benefits are kept close to home (e.g., schools, quality
of streets, policing, etc.). Consider a social policy of alleviating poverty.
Recently, commentators have proposed that sound transportation
170
policies could help poor mothers who cannot commute to work.
Organ Draft and a ProposedModel Organ DraftAct, 68 B.U. L. Rav. 681 (1988).
oee, e.g., Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas,supra note 3.
166
5ee ROUSSEAU, supranote 152, at 9-13.
1671d. at 9.
68
1 1d.
1691d.
170See, e.g., Catherine Blake, Survey To Deal With TransportationNeeds, L.A. TIMwES,
Mar. 9, 2000, at 3; Jean Hopfensperger, Study Offers A Hand on Welfare-To-Work, STAR

2002]

RETHINKING LEGISLATIVE CONSENTLAW?

Such policies could include providing cars to these women. 7 ' if
poverty and homelessness could be eliminated, or at least alleviated, by
individuals having the ability to obtain jobs and commute to work,
wouldn't that be a good social cause?
However, the state does not mandate that individuals with more
than five cars provide one to a capable but "transportationless"
individual so that she might attend school, go to work, participate in a
training program, or pick up her children from childcare. Having five
cars seems a bit excessive; after all, how many cars does one need?
Clearly, automobiles are not needed after death. Thus, although the cars
could be left to a deceased person's family, would they need them? It is
not inconceivable that one of the best social uses for multiple cars from
an estate would be to provide one to the state for a campaign to
eliminate poverty.
Would we dare shape a proposal that requires those who die with
five cars to leave one to the state as part of an anti-poverty program?
Probably not, although sharing one of five cars is clearly not as invasive
when compared with removing one's organs for transplantation into a
stranger. If an anti-poverty car policy worked as clandestinely as
presumed consent presently does, the policy might seem all the more
outrageous. The wealthy, who would likely be disproportionately
affected by this plan, might charge that it is unfair to those who earned
their cars through hard work. Why, they might persuasively argue,
should the burden of helping the underclass be disproportionately borne
by them?
One could extrapolate and apply the same reasoning to the dead.
At one's death the State does not transfer one's property to a stranger
simply because it might benefit the person receiving the property.
In theory, life tenancy in human flesh, while troubling, is
nonetheless thought provoking. If Americans participated in a new
social program, which allowed the State to use their bodies as needed at
death, perhaps more transplants would occur.17 2 The plan could occur
with limited restrictions placed on the donor during life, thereby
TRIBUNE,
Mar. 17, 2000, at IA.
171See Pat Harper, Savoring A Role in Workplace, CIE. TRM., May 11, 1999, at 3; Blake,
supra note
170; Hopfensperger, supra note 170.
12
7 Fentiman, supranote 57.
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causing minimal interference in lifestyle, and the donor could perform
the ultimate form of community service. 173 Arguably, this type of
service to the State is less invasive and risky than military service, 174 or
even jury duty. Indeed, in other capacities service to the State may alter
one's lifestyle through injury, for example, and emotional and physical
health could become an issue. Hence, proponents like Fentiman and
Dukeminier conclude that presumed consent at one's death allows one
to sbrve the State while, unlike175in military service, not being burdened
with the obligation during life.
Nevertheless, there is something eerie about the State's
involvement with body ownership. America's precedent with treating
the body as property, slavery, surely demonstrates the absurdity of
community ownership in the body or the ownership of anyone other
than the possessor embodying the flesh. While it might be equally eerie
to think of self-ownership from the grave, somehow that seems less
unconscionable than the state partaking
in ownership, use, and possibly
176
research activities with corpses.
Ironically, theories of tenancies in the flesh with some reversion to
the community were not applied to slaves, as their masters or owners
were protected and respected within the context of the law as propertied
persons. 177 Mills argues that slavery, as a form of ownership of
another, was justified under an unnamed social and economic policy to
which he refers as the "slavery contract."1 78 Basic principles of
property jurisprudence make clear that owned possessions are under the
exclusive direction of the owner. 179 To illustrate, although the
institution of slavery provided a collective benefit to the growth and
development of America, slaves were not on loan to their masters for a

'id. at 1598.

74
'75
1d. at 1600.

1 Fentiman, supra note 57; Dukeminier, supra note 164. See also Silver, supra note
164.

176See Scott, infra note 245, at 27 (commenting on Western slavery starting in 10A.D.
1066 when the Normans conquered the Anglo-Saxons who had a "fully developed, legally
regulated system of slavery." Slavery would not disappear in the West until the nineteenth
century).
'77See MILLS, supra note 158, at 24-25.

'78Id. at 24.
179See ROUSSEAU, supranote 152, at 21.
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18 0
life tenancy, with reversion to the greater community at their deaths.

Because slavery was a financial as well as a social institution, its
success depended on maximizing the use of its workforce (property).
Thus, any appropriation of the enslaved, either during or after the
slave's life,8would
have required compensation from the appropriator to'
1
the owner.
An historical examination of the law's engagement with the body

more accurately demonstrates the community's distance from the body
at death. In fact, the law's only interaction with the body at death was to
order its speedy and sanitary burial.' 82 Despite its incoherence, the
common law as related to corpses demonstrates more clearly a
protection of the community from outrage and nuisance, rather than
protecting or recognizing a community ownership of the dead. A
review of the legal history illumes the status of the body at death.
DeadBodies & The Courts
To hurl a dead body into a river, to cremate a dead body in a manner
which might cause a public nuisance, and to mutilate a dead body were
all offenses at common law.' 83 At common law, the state's interest in

the disposal of dead bodies was premised on concerns for public health

180See ROBERT WiLiAm FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE
EcONOMIcs OF EMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974); JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE
COMMUNTY: PLANTATION LHE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SoUTH (1972)(critiquing slavery in the

American South).

' 81
82FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supranote 180.

1 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Welch, 82 F.2d 799 (1936); O'Donnell v. Slack, 55 Pac. Rep.
906, 907 (1899) (opining that "the duty of the burial of the dead is made an express legal
obligation").
"8 3State v. Bradbury, 9 A.2d 657 (Me. 1939). In Bradbury, the defendant was convicted
for the common law offense of burning a body in an indecent manner that would evoke public
outrage and disgust. To expedite the disposal of his sister's body, the defendant built a hot fire
in his basement furnace, bound the legs of his dead sister, and dragged her to the cellar, where
he shoved her into the burning stove. The court emphasized that such activity caused a "heavy
dark smoke" with a disagreeable odor to pour from the house. Holding the defendant guilty of
improper disposal of a corpse, the court noted that the brother's actions toward the corpse were
reprehensible and void of any decency expected of civilized people. Id.
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and decency. 184 Thus, any disposal of a dead body that was contrary to
85
common decency was considered a criminal offense.
Traditionally, the right to bury or otherwise dispose of the dead
belonged to the decedent's next of kin.186 This possessory interest was
considered a "quasi property" right by most courts.187 Until the
nineteenth century, a person had no power to direct the disposition of
her body at death. 188 Courts recognized the burial duties of the next of
kin for two reasons. First, public health and safety required the speedy
burial of dead bodies. This goal was achieved with relatively low
transaction costs because relatives already had possession of the body.
Moreover, the state bore minimal enforcement expenses because
relatives had an
emotional stake in expediting the burial or disposition
189
corpse.
the
of
Second, it was assumed that the decedent's next of kin would
benefit from the decedent's estate; therefore, it was expected that some
of that benefit should or would be appropriated to pay for burial
expenses. Burial rationales premised on public health and decency led
to the establishment by the common law courts of limited property
rights in the dead recognizing the next of kin as the proper party to
dispose of relative's bodies. 190 Courts made clear that while such rights
184See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, Alas! Poor Yorick, IKnew Him Ex Utero: The Regulation
of Embryo and FetalExperimentation and Disposal in England and the United States, 39
VAND). L. Rnv. 419,426 (1986).
85
1186
1d.
Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 186 A. 585, 586 (N.J. 1936); Jaffe, supra note 24,
at 543. Jaffe notes:
The current rule at common law is that the next of kin have the right to
possess the dead body for the purposes of burial or other disposition. The
right is typically characterized as one for possession of the cadaver, in
undisturbed condition, and gives rise to actions such as wrongful autopsy
and wrongful possession of the body.
Id. (footnote omitted).
187
Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Spiegel, 186 A. at
585); In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 n.5 (Utah 1978); Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d
304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Louisiana has indeed established a 'quasi-property' right of survivors
in the remains of their deceased relatives."); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984)
("Under Arkansas law, the next of kin does have a quasi-property right in a dead body")

(citation omitted).
188

See Dukeminier, supra note 164.
1891d.
' 9"Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 480-81.
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are not absolute in the full proprietary sense (i.e., owning the body),
property rights nevertheless exist in the flesh for purposes of corpse
disposition and are protected by the courts. 191 Most courts refer to this
right as one of "quasi property." With the recognition of this property
mishandling or mutilation of the
interest, relatives aggrieved by the
192
redress.
legal
to
entitled
are
corpse
However, the burial statutes, which recognize or vest a property
interest in the next of kin, provide a limited possessory right. For
example, a relative cannot choose to sell the corpse of her deceased
relative, although she might be able to sell her hair, nails, and other
body parts. Other rights, as Jaffe points out, "are excluded from the
193
common-law formulation" of quasi property rights in the dead.
Indeed, this right does not exist during the decedents life, it cannot be
conveyed, has no pecuniary value, and caries the liability for
disposition.194 Prosser and Keeton characterize the nature of claims
related to property interest in dead bodies as "something evolved out of
thin air to meet the occasion, and that in reality the personal feelings of
protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no
the survivors are being
195
lawyer.
a
one but
However, as law and technology have evolved in the area of the
genetics, for example, individuals may now claim interest in the
disposal of their own bodies. This right has not always been clear. In
fact, some courts have recognized it as a limited right, noting that "laws
191

1d. But see Doodeward v. Spence, 6 C.L.R. 406 (Austi. 1908) (holding that possessory
interests vesting in the next-of-kin were not limited to burial). In Doodeward, the High Court
of Australia determined that a mother had a posessory right in the corpse of her two-headed,
still-born child. Forty years after the child's birth in New Zealand the mother discovered that
the corpse had been preserved by the physician and later sold to a carnival owner, who charged
an admission fee for the public to view the body. The court upheld the plaintiffs cause of
action in conversion and detinue, holding that the law did not forbid the possession of a human
body for purposes other than burial.
192See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991); Crocker v. Pleasant,
No. SC95148, 2001 Fla. LEXIS 151; 26 FLA. L. WEEKLY S61, Feb. 1, 2001 (clarifying that
Florida recognizes a limited right to possession of the body of a loved one for burial which
constitutes a legitimate claim of entitlement or quasi-property interest entitled to procedural
due process protection under the Constitution).
193
Jaffe, supra note 24, at 543.
94
1 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

ed. 1984).

195ld.

12, at 63 (5th
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relating to wills and the descent of property were not intended to relate
to the body of a deceased. 1 96 However, some of the common law
limitations have been lifted by subsequent statute, thereby creating and
197
granting the decedent herself first interest of corpse disposition.
Decisions dealing with property rights in dead bodies were first
rendered in English courts. Justice Martin in Brotherton observed that
the "English common law held that there was no property right in a
dead body, and therefore, it could not be disposed of by will."'198 Such
decisions have been criticized by legal scholars, "noting that the
primary reason for the rule was the historical anomaly that all matters
concerning dead bodies were under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts, and thus, were not subject to common-law analysis."'199 Early
American courts had mixed interpretations of claims involving dead
bodies; some adopted the English common-law rule, while others "held
that the rule was unsound" given the evident nature of rights bestowed
upon relatives to possess and dispose of the decedents.2 °1 It is now the
prevailing rule in England and the United States that there exists at least
a "quasi property interest" in dead bodies. The recognition of those
rights should, and naturally does, correlate with advancements in
technology, biotechnology, and medical advancements.
Most judges, scholars, and commentators agree that statutory
intervention became necessary to increase organ donation. 2 1 As public
awareness grew regarding organ donation, more individuals desired to
participate in the process. However, this posed a problem for doctors
confronted with relatives refusing to relinquish disposition rights of the
corpse. The 1968 and 1987.02 UAGAs thus served to eliminate the
tension surrounding burial rights, allowing individuals to determine the
20 3
disposition of their bodies prior to their deaths.
196In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978).

197See Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (1987).
.9 Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481 (citation omitted).
199
20 1d. (citation omitted).
1d
201 "
Lyon v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 531 (D. Minn. 1994); Ramirez v. Health Partners
of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1998); Anderson, supra note 65; Coleman, supra
note 76;
Jaffe, supra note 24.
202
UAGA 1987 2.
203
See Moyer, 577 P.2d at 110 (holding that a person has a property interest in his body).
The Supreme Court of Utah upheld the decedent's right to determine the post-mortem
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In fact, courts have interpreted the UAGA to support an
individual's possessory rights and property interest in her body, even in
death. The Utah Supreme Court relied on the state's adoption of the
UAGA in the case of In re Moyer.20 4 In that case, the decedent's
mother disregarded his disposition plans, having his body buried
instead of cremated as per his request. 20 5 The decedent's representative
obtained a court order to exhume and cremate the body according to the
original request of the decedent. On the mother's appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court upheld the lower court order, holding that the decedent
nature in determining "the disposition
had a property right of a20 special
6
death.,
after
of his body
The law has not generally provided for the reversion of corpses
back to the community through either statute or common law Native
American treaty resolutions and developments as ideal, though 2on
07
quick inspection several cases seem to point in that direction.
However, certain cases involving hospital misappropriation and
nonconsensual removal of body materials have turned on whether such
actions occurred in good faith. Both the Ramirez and Lyon cases
discussed earlier are instructive on this point. In both cases, summary
judgment was granted based on the conclusion that the defendant
hospitals acted in good faith when arranging to have decedent's body
parts removed. In both cases, the families signed forms that were
disposition
2 4 of his body. Id.
Id. at 110 n.4.
2 05

1d.

205

Id. at 110.

207

See, e.g., State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986). See also Georgia Lions Eye
Bank v. Lavant, 335 S.E. 2d 127 (Ga. 1985). In Georgia Lions, parents of an accident victim
filed suit against an eye bank that was authorized by the state medical examiner to remove their
son's corneas. The parents were not consulted and did not authorized the removal. The trial
court held in favor of the parents, finding that the imposed consent statute violates due process
in that it deprives a person of a property right in the corpse of her next of kin, and fails to
provide notice and an opportunity to object. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that
there is no constitutionally protected right in a decedent's body. Id. at 128. The majority
rationalized the concept of "quasi-property" rights to be a mere regulation which promotes
public health and safety. The court further held that whatever quasiproperty right existed was
not of constitutional dimension. Id. at 129. However, Justice Marshall's dissent noted that the
statute failed to provide notice to the next-of-kin and a realistic opportunity to object to the
organ removal, thereby fundamentally denying due process. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
also Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
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misread and subsequently miscommunicated to procurement agencies
that removed tissues or bones without the families' consent. Both
families filed suit upon learning that hospital staff had
miscommunicated their intent, and thereby permitted the removal of
their children's tissues.
The reasoning of both courts focused on the confusion resulting
from miscommunicated or mistaken consent. The courts distinguished
the claims regarding mishandling of dead persons based in mere
negligence from those involving intent. The Ramirez court was clear in
distinguishing its decision, based on "mistaken communication" done
in good faith (and thereby recognizing the hospital's qualified
immunity), from the decision in Peny, a case involving a nurse
engaged in "intentional wrongdoing," who demonstrated "more than a
mere mistake, bad judgment, or understandable confusion" when
coercing a family to donate tissues of its decedent. 20 8 The Court
concluded that, "as the Perry case illustrates, claimants who have been
injured by bad faith actions of person involved in the organ donation
process may sue and recover against them." 209 Nevertheless, one might
conclude, perhaps accurately, that the Ramirez court, along with others,
supports the notion that ultimately the State's interest in saving lives
outweighs individual or family disposition requests.210
20

Ramirez, 972 P.2d at 667 (distinguishing Perry v. St. Francis Hosp. and Med. Ctr.,
886 F.
Supp. 1551 (D. Kan. 1995)).
209Id
"

210

The Court notes that organ donation is "often referred to as the 'gift of life,"' and
observes that, even as a "recent medical phenomenon" it saves lives and has "tremendous
benefits for mankind." Id. The Court went on to state that "even if qualified immunity were not
provided by statute, the foregoing policy considerations militate in favor of such protection and
influence our crafting of common law liability rules in this area." Id.
The Ramirez court also distinguished that case from previous cases involving the
mishandling of dead bodies. Id. at 665. In prior successful plaintiff decisions, the Court noted,
organ donation was not at issue, pointing to perhaps a future of common law decisions where
claims involving organ donation are weighed differently. Previous Arizona courts that
addressed the issue relied on the Restatement 868, which provides in part: "One who
intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body
of a dead person or prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability to a
member of the family of the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body." Id.
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 868 (1979)). While the RESTATEMENT would appear
to fit squarely into an analysis based on negligence, the Court provided several loosely guided
reasons against doing so in this particular case. The Ramirez family, relying on two prior
Appellate Court decisions invoking the RESTATEMENT, was undoubtedly surprised by the
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Consider also that some Courts recognize the nonconsensual
appropriation of body parts from cadavers as cognizable claims under
42 U.S.C. section 1983. In those cases, the courts recognize that the
next of kin have been deprived a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, and that the deprivation occurred under color
of law.2 1 1 To assert a valid due process claim, a plaintiff must
successfully demonstrate (1) a deprivation, (2) of property, (3) under
color of state law.212 The Brotherton v. Cleveland court, sitting in a
presumed consent jurisdiction, found that those elements were met in a
widow's civil action arising out of the county coroner's violation of
equal protection and due process rights in authorizing the procurement
and donation of her husband's comeas without her consent. Although
the lower court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, the
Court of Appeals held that the widow had a legitimate interest and
claim of entitlement in her husband's body (including his comeas)
protected by the due process clause, and that the procurement was
caused by established state procedures requiring a "predeprivation"
process.2 1 3 The Court reasoned that "the importance of establishing
rights in a dead bodies has been, and will continue to be, magnified by
scientific advancements," noting that the human body is a "valuable
resource." 214 Judge Martin concluded that it was not inconceivable that
in the future kidneys, hearts, and other organs could be maintained
outside of the body, alluding also to the capacity to cultivate the
resources in a dead body. 15
Courts reasoning: "that we followed 868 for claims of wrongful disinterment, burial, and
disposal of a decedent's remains does not necessarily mean that we should do so in this case."
Id.
21 Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1991).
212
Id. at 479. Note also, the Brotherton Courts observations:
[T]hese three elements are necessary to establish a violation of due process
under the fourteenth amendment; however, they alone are insufficient. She
must also show either (1) the conduct was caused by "established state
procedure rather than random and unauthorized action," . . . or (2) the
means of redress for property deprivations provided by the state of Ohio
fail to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.
Id. (citations omitted).
23
1d. at 477.
21'4
1d. at 481.
2 15
1d.
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Nevertheless, it has become clearer over time that one is in full
possession and in some ownership of herself, at least in life, and
perhaps also in death. 16 Moore v. Regents of the University of
Californiacase struggles with this idea, but quite clearly concludes that
"for better or worse, we have irretrievably entered an age that requires
examination of our understanding of legal right and relationships in the
human body and the human cell., 2 17 In Moore, the plaintiff suffered
from hairy cell leukemia and underwent a spleen-removal operation at
the UCLA Medical Center. After the operation, and without the
plaintiffs consent, doctors used the spleen to produce a cell line, which
they later patented. Upon discovering this, Moore sued the doctors for
conversion. Although his conversion claim on appeal ultimately failed,
the court nevertheless recognized a possessory interest held in one's
body, holding that the rights of dominion are so similar to property
2 18
interests "that it would be subterfuge to call them something else.,
The subsequent tension in Moore regarding the conversion claim, could
perhaps best be characterized by the Court's reticence to open a
potential floodgate of litigation by extending the tort of conversion in
that particular context along with considerations about the benefits of
medical research.219 If perhaps adjudicated today, the ultimate holding
in Moore might be significantly different. While state action may limit
this right or limit certain activities (e.g., organ selling, prostitution, and
sodomy) in which one may engage with respect to her body, it
nonetheless vests the individual with broad authority to treat her body
as she wishes during and after life. Moreover, it rests post-mortem
disposition of the corpse with the individual or her family rather than
the State.

216

Jefferies, supra note 26, at 627. Jefferies notes: "With human materials, people
certainly
own
them, but lack the stick which encompasses the right to sell." Id.
217
Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 504 (Ct. App.

1988). 21

1d. at 505. But see also, Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120
(1990) (clarifying that plaintiff had no ownership interest in his cells after they left his body,
however opining that Moore did state a claim for breach of physicians disclosure of
obligations).
219 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 136 (1990) (noting that "we
consider... whether it is advisable to extend the tort to this context").
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The Body & Social Contract Theory
There does appear, however, to be a cultural
impediment to personification of the corpse. The
reason is that personification of the body, alive or
dead, would seem to demand the embodiment of
the person, but this is not the Western way of
thinking ofpersons who are conceived of, instead,
as abstract will. We might even say that the
Western220legal person is a brain (really a mind) on
a stalk.
Presumed consent is perhaps best justified through the social
contract. 22 1 Viewed through a collective scheme of social justice, the
procurement and allocation of scarce organs is a worthy social goal.222
In.various ways our national healthcare system has demonstrated a
commitment to promoting health and safety, and provides a safety net
for the very poor through Medicaid and Medicare. This distribution is
to address present health needs through societal obligation, and helps to
correct past inequities that unfairly burden the disenfranchised and limit
their opportunities.
Although philosophers and scholars, among them Rousseau,
Rawls, Hobbes, and Locke, who carved out early thinking on social
obligations, duties, and responsibilities for the nation State are not
commonly invoked in judicial opinions considering presumed consent,
22ONgaire Naffine, 'But a Lump ofEarth?': The Legal Status ofthe Corpse, in COURTING
DEATH, supra note 1, at 106 (1999).
22'For an overview of social contract theory, see RoussEAu, supra note 148; Ernest
Barker, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU
(1947); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); MICHAEL LEssNoFF, SOCIAL CONTRACT
(1986); Will Kymlicka, The Social Contract Tradition, IN A COMPANION TO ETHICS (1991);
Jean Hampton, Contract and Content, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (Goodin & Pettit eds., 1993).
Other justifications for presumed consent can be made, including: (a) presumed consent
avoids families having to be approached about organ donation--and the negative consequences
possibly experienced by grieving family members who now must be asked for authorization;
(b) presumed consents are real, not illusory consents. One truly has a choice of whether to
donate. The opt-out provisions provide protections for the potential donor and her family who
may decide to change their minds.
222Fentiman, supra note 57.
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their philosophical child, social contractual theory, is not as removed.
Indeed, social compact theory may be the strongest argument for
presumed consent. While the quality, or perhaps the potential outcome
for the argument does not rise to the level necessary to justify its
prophylactic implementation, since it limits individual autonomy and
removes donor consent (at least in my opinion), it is nonetheless worthy
of consideration in this article.
Ideally, presumed consent promotes the equitable distribution of
scarce resources. As with other organ procurement schemes, it poses
moral and ethical challenges. 223 Fentiman, Dukeminier, and Nelson
argue, however, that these moral challenges are largely overcome by the
tremendous social good that is done.224 Annually, over 69,000 people
await new organs. 225 Some will die before a donor is found. Waitlists
are long, and organs are neither distributed in the order in which
recipients signed up, nor by an assessment of the sickest patients'
medical needs. Proponents suggest that presumed consent could ease
the collective suffering and death of people awaiting organ transplants.
Accordingly, presumed consent proponents argue that it maximizes a
community good for the benefit of all people, with a relatively small
collective burden.226
However, presumed or legislative consent policies are too morally
problematic to be justified under a social compact theory. Informed
consent is the cornerstone of our authorization system, particularly for
medical treatment.227 Morally, it seems more palatable and more
ethically prudent to have individuals informed about decisions affecting
their lives, particularly their bodies. Of course, part of the justification
for informed consent is that the more informed people are, the better
decision makers they will become. Well-informed decision makers can
"2 1d. at 1600 (commenting that presumed consent could be viewed as "un-American").
224Id. See also Dukeminier, supra note 164; Pinsley, supra note 111 (discussing James
Nelson's presumed consent proposal).
225Telephone interview with Scott Helm, (Apr. 20, 2000) (providing recent figures for
organ waitlists); Telephone interviews with Dr. Ellison, Representative, United Network of
Organ Sharing (July, 1999 and Aug., 1999) [hereinafter Ellison Interview].
22 6See Linda Fentiman, Organ Donations as a National Service: A ProposedFederal

OrganDonationLaw, 27 SuFFOLK L. RaV. 177 (1997).
227Barry D. Kahan, Organ Donation and Transplantation-A Surgeon's View, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS AND REALniIES supra note 31, at 126, 128-29.
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assume greater control and responsibility over their lives, thereby
limiting the need for government intervention.
However, legislative consent strips bare informed consent, leaving
at best a tacit agreement to be construed as consent.228 Most
importantly, the "people" are left out of legislative consent. An opt-out
scheme is not consent, and the true effect of the measure would be to
circumvent bona fide consent, thereby sidestepping the involvement of
Americans. Moreover, the metaphorical presumption of consent from
the legislature cannot override the importance of individual decisionmaking and autonomy. It seems inappropriate and unsound from a
medical perspective that the State could speak about the intimate and
personal spheres of death in a collective and distant manner.
Social questions arise when the State is involved in determining
how one may use her body.229 In the context of privacy rights, of
course, thoughts on the body and the State's authority to interfere with
those rights have far-reaching implications, and, unfortunately,
sometimes may be pre-determined by ones gender, sexual orientation,
race and socio-economic status. American atrocities in healthcare
230
experimentation illustrate this point. From eugenics and sterilization,
to the infamous experiments with destitute black men suffering from
syphilis (later known as The Tuskegee Experiments), 231 and raids in the
homes of gay men, the American government has played a role in
influencing how certain bodies are to be valued, used, and whether
some are more expendable or valuable than others.2 32 Of course, one
could conclude, as many have over the years, that some bodies (e.g.,

228

Arguably, one is tacitly agreeing that her body is out of her control if it comes before

the coroner for an investigation. This means that presumed consent would be tied to one's
behavior or actions. Behaviors such as reckless living or driving might accordingly hasten one's
appearance before the coroner. As such, one's behavior predetermines whether or not one will
be a donor.
22Self-mutilation, suicide and masturbation are three areas where the rules of
engagement are not entirely clear.
23DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY, 59-76 (1997).
2 1 FRED D. GRAY, THE TUSKEGEE SYPHIIs STUDY: AN INSIDERS ACCOUNT OF THE
SHOCKING MEDICAL EXPERIMENT CONDUCTED BY GOvERNMENT DOCTORS AGAINST AFRICAN

AMERICANMEN, 143 (1998).
232 Nelson, supra note 111.
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white ones) are more valuable than others (e.g., those of color),233 or
conversely, that an inalienable right to preserve and protect one's body
has been recognized for some more than for others.
Whether scholars or judges will ever agree as to who owns what in
the body, it is nevertheless clear from the common law that possession
is one of the most fundamental elements indicating property
ownership. 4 Perhaps one of the most important questions to be
answered is whether or not that ownership or possession can or should
be compromised to fulfill a state interest in organ procurement and
donation. The Brotherton court, closely on point with this question,
found that the State's interest was not so substantial as to burden one's
property rights in the body. However, in a passionate dissent, Judge
Joiner parted ways with the majority, suggesting that much of the
common law regarding dead bodies evolved from burial statutes, which
were necessarily narrowly tailored to fit such an occasion, and perhaps
not intended to address broader issues of property ownership.235
Indeed, some courts refuse to address whether a property interest is
at stake or not. They focus instead on the value provided to the greater
society with what they suggest is limited, if any, abrogation of rights of
the deceased or her kin. These courts also seem to insinuate that if a
property right was burdened by the State's interest in preserving "the
health of the living," such would be properly within the scope of the
State's authority, pointing to, perhaps a "social contract" 236 between the
State and its citizens.
According to Professor Anita Allen, "social contract theories seek
to legitimate civil authority by appealing to notions of rational
agreement. '237 Allen states that these theories, referred to in early
modem social contractarianism as the "state of nature," are
233

See id. (noting that "medical research in the nineteenth and even twentieth century
reveals, we have been more than willing to subject those who were 'clearly less valuable' to the
rigors of research"). See also MILLS, supra note 158, at 62 (speaking of blacks as the race most
"alienated from their own bodies")
4
23
235See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991).
1d. at 483 (Joiner, J., dissenting) (rejecting the theory of property ownership in dead
bodies).23

6Anita Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1, 10
(1999) (noting that "like 'state of nature,' the expression 'social contract' has multiple meanings
in the law").
237
1d. at 2.
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encompassed by both hypothetical and actual circumstances dealing
with politics, law and morality.2 38 Allen observes that "[s]ocial
contract theories provide that rational individuals will agree by contract,
compact, or covenant to give up the condition of unregulated freedom
in exchange for the' 239security of a civil society governed by a just,
binding rule of law. ,
Some scholars suggest that social compact theory has been with
America since her early days, having what Allen refers to as a special
relationship with the United States legal system. 240 This relationship,
historians note, influenced the development of the Constitution, the
Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights, and they credit it
with providing the revolutionary spirit that helped early Americans toil
and war for a unified state.2 41 Pauline Maier noted that fundamental
ideas about public responsibility and duty and political responsibilities
242
in the social compact shaped the American revolutionary movement.
This compact had great importance for America's propertied founders,
perhaps
but also those with an "othered" status, as they were
243
out.
them
left
ultimately
that
agreement
an
to
contributors
Thus, what this compact means in modem negotiations and
relationships may be more difficult to answer.24 Whether the social
compact works for those who have traditionally experienced the
American legal, political, and health systems on the margins seems
answered by their continued disenfranchisement.245 Such an inquiry
=Sid.
"9 id.
2

40ld. See also LESSNOFF, supra note 220; Will Kymlicka, supra note 220; MARION

YOUNG, JUSTICE AND TH POLITICS OF DFERENCE (1990).

241 Thad W. Tate, The Social Contractin America, 1774-1787, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 375
(1965); BERNARD BAiLYN, Tm IDEOLOGICAL ORIGNS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 58-59
(1967); ARTHUR E. SUTERLAND, CONSTTrmONAuSM IN AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF
ITS FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS (1965).
24
2432See PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION 27 (1972).
According to Professor Allen, America's compact with its citizens spans issues from
"sovereignty, slavery, alienage, the negligence rule, criminal incarceration, Congressional
nondelegation, land use, the law of finds, public health, self-incrimination, civil forfeiture, debt
collection, and the right to privacy." Allen, supra note 235 at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
2
44See MILLS, supra note 158, at 62-75 ("arguing that the Racial Contract underwrites the
modem245social contract and is continually being rewritten.").
DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN Tm RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL
POLICY IN AMERICA, 61-62 (1999) (speaking to blacks continued economic
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also points to whether the social compact obligates their involvement.
These questions are not only provocative, but aim to point out
America's historical inequities as related to certain groups, and ask
whether more can be expected from them when they have traditionally
received less. 246 Charles Mills, professor of philosophy, argues that the
"Racial Contract" undercuts the evolution of the modem version of the
contract. The social contract, he argues: "characterized by an
antipatriarchalist Enlightenment liberalism, with its proclamations of
the equal rights, autonomy, and freedom of all men, thus took place
simultaneously with the massacre, -expropriation, and subjection to
hereditary slavery of men at least apparently human." 247 The
contradiction, Mills argues, needs to be reconciled, and it is best
conceived or reconciled "through the Racial Contract, which essentially
denies their
personhood and restricts the terms of the social contract to
248
whites.
Accordingly, the early American social compacts excluded blacks
and other nonwhites, frequently finding them outside the American
legal, political and social agreement, and therefore not entitled to the
privileges and immunities granted whites. 249 According to Francis
Jennings, "to invade and dispossess the people of an unoffending
civilized country would violate morality and transgress the principles of
international law;" however, he reconciled, "savages were exceptional.
Being uncivilized by definition, they were outside the sanctions of both
morality and law., 250
Whether contemporary policies or the
applicationof laws and medical customs perpetuate that philosophy can
be examined through case law, policies, and practices. 25 1 Thus, we
disenfranchisement).
246
8ee MILLS,

supra note 158, at 64; DredScott v. Sanford, 1856, in RACE, CLASS, AND
GENDER IN THE UNITED STATES 401 (Paula S. Rothenberg, ed., 4th ed. 1998); DAVID E.
STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: COLUMBUS AND THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLDS
(1992).
247

MILLS, supra note 158, at 63-64.
248Id.at 64.
24 9

See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROw (1955); W.E.B.

DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (1935).
0

2' FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT

OF CONQUEST 60 (1975).
25 1
See ROBERTS, supra note 229; ABRAHAM, supra note 2; Noah, supra note 37; Randall,
supra note 38. For a critique of American racial policy or the law in action on education,
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must probe beyond the face of the law, to the law as applied or in
action.
Presumed consent derives part of its authority from notions of a
social contract between the State and its citizens as related to public
health.252 In the past, the State has invoked the social compact to
justify its authority in requiring certain obligations of its citizens.
Indeed, the State has relied on the social contract to address public
health concerns. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,253 a case involving
compulsory vaccinations, the Court referred to the Massachusetts
Constitution, arguing that a fundamental principle of the social contract
requires that citizens are governed according to a common good, and
therefore must 2sacrifice,
comply, and otherwise acquiesce to that
"common good. 54
Judge Joiner's dissent in Brotherton, embraces traditional notions
associated with social compact theory. Although he refused to
acknowledge any property rights in the human body, thereby ignoring
America's passion, and indeed her technological prowess with
exploring, harvesting and exchanging body parts, his analysis can avoid
addressing that issue. He relies on the community good that is
performed through the act of organ donation. Throughout his passionate
dissent, Judge Joiner reminds us that the State's nonconsensual
appropriation of the decedent's eyes would "bring sight and health to
the living disabled, and thus to society as a whole."255 In fact, the
community benefit argument may be one of the most salient and
compelling arguments articulated by presumed consent supporters, and
one of the more difficult to refute. Theoretically, presumed consent
saves lives, and Americans have decided that saving lives is a worthy
cause for the State. But have Americans chosen to give up informed
housing, wealth, and employment see, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); STEPHEN STEINBERG, TuRN NG BLACK: THE
RETREAT FROM RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN THOUGHr AND PoLicY (1995); TOM WICKER,
TRAGIC FAILuRE: RACIAL INTEGRATION IN AMERICA (1996) MELViN L. OLivER & THOMAS M.
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PRESPECTrIVE ON RACIAL INEQUAUITY;
CONLEY, supra note 244.

2 23Fentiman, supra note 57, at 1598.
25Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
254Id. at 27.
25 Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 199 1) (Joiner, J., dissenting).
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consent and autonomous decision-making? Arguably they have not, and

certainly the response to nonconsensual appropriation of body parts
indicates that most Americans are unwilling to compromise on this
point.
The arguments supporting presumed consent evoke images of

bodies "on loan" to the state, available for whatever uses will best
benefit the community. 256 Fentiman talks about presumed consent
being a community service, or a duty, like military service. 257 In that
context, young men and women surrender their bodies in ready
preparedness for combat and possible death for the purpose of
preserving the State. However, broad claims of a presumed contract
between all citizens and the United States
are not only potentially
25 8

problematic, but they also lack legitimacy
My purpose in examining the notion of a social contract, which
justifies presumed consent, is to illume what Allen calls the "seductive,
malleable fiction" that there exists such a social policy wherein all
parties subject to the agreement are treated equitably.25 9 America's

history with her social contract in many ways mirrors her history with
healthcare.26 ° In general, women and men of color have been left
out.261 Historically, those who were acknowledged and given
256

Fentiman, supra note 57, at 1598-1602. Fentiman argues that presumed use of organs
would be similar to a national service like that of the military, where individuals serve for the
benefit of the "greater community." Id. The difference, as the author highlights earlier in this
article, is that the flawed allocation system creates a disparity in terms of who in the greater
community will be served by such an enormous sacrifice. Accordingly, some argue that a
corpse cannot feel the emotional weight of the act, thus perhaps pointing to an inability to be
diserviced or betrayed by the act. Id. The betrayal could be compared to enlisted soldiers
returning from integrated armies to segregated communities.
257id.

258
MILLs, supra note 158, at 73.
259
Allen, supra note 235, at 13
260

See GRAY, supra note 230; JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TuSKEGEE SYPHIms
ExPERImENT (1981).
21ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 4-5; Denise Grady, DiscriminationIs Painful,It Can Also
Be Agonizing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2000, 4, at 2; Brigid Schulte, Minorities Face Unequal
Health in U.S.: Statistics Show Ethnicitles EncounterHigher Illness Rates, FT. WORTH STARTELEGRAM, Aug. 2, 1998, at 1; Editorial, Institutionalized Racism In Health Care, THE
LANCET, Mar. 6, 1999, No. 9155, Vol. 353, at 765; Ismail Turay, Jr., Reps Press Minority
Health Research, DAYTON DAILY NEwS Ohio), Feb. 3, 2000, at 3A; Editorial,Accepted For
Too Long The DisparityIn Health of White andBlack Won't DisappearBy Itself, DES MOINES
REGISTER (Iowa), Feb. 25, 2000, at 12.
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legitimacy in America's social contract were white, land-owning
men. 262 Others hoped to be considered in the contract, and thus bravely
shared resources, life, taxes, materials, education, and skills. Some of
America's first sons to die in battles for whites to be free were men of
color (e.g., fugitive slaves like Crispus Attucks or Native
Americans).263 It is America's history with social contract philosophy
and its relation to the legal system that poses potentially problematic
results for those who are disenfranchised and marginalized in the organ

transplantation and donation systems.
A brief examination of the intersection of law, history, and what
Professor Anthony Farley refers to as the colorline, reveals America's
disturbing relationship with black Americans. 2 64 Of course, as slaves,
blacks lacked political and legal standing in the United States; they

were neither protected by, nor recognized within the context of the law.
Moreover, blacks were deprived of social status, and were more often
compared with field animals than human beings. Surely part of

America's social contract relied on recognition and some form of
citizenship which evidently aided in the contract's enforcement. Blacks,
even those American-born, were forbidden citizenship, and thus kept
out of the benefits of the law. 265 However, this is not to say that blacks
were not contributors to America's growth and development; indeed

they were,

as builders,

agriculturists,

subjects

for

scientific

262

See MILLS, supra note 158.

263

Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly, Thurgood Marshall Commemorative Issue: Keynote
Address, 35 How. L.J. 61 (1991) (noting that "African Americans, have been in America for
four centuries. We have defended America in every war and revolution since Crispus Attucks.
We have contributed to her growth, enriched her culture, served her well. It's time for us to
claim ownership, to own a piece of the American rock. This is our country and we need to
embrace her as such; for we are Americans"); Daniel H. Pollitt, Reflection on the Bicentennial
of The Bill of Rights: The Flag Burning Controversy: A Chronology, 70 N.C.L. Rav. 553
(1992) (commenting on observations that "the first American to fall in the Revolutionary War
was Crispus Attucks

. .

. an African-American who died for freedom a century before our

Nation ended slavery"); Constance Baker Motley, Thurgood Marshall,68 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 208
(1993) (noting the symbol of heroism and loyalty found in those like Crispus Attucks,
commenting that "it was not until Thurgood Marshall's funeral in January 1993 that I came to
the full realization that in death he has become an authentic American Hero Crispus Attucks, a
Patrick Henry a Thomas Jefferson, a George Washington, an Abraham Lincoln, a Martin
Luther King").
2
6See Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 ORE. L. Rlv. 457
(1997).
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experimentation, and educators. They were contributors to a contract
that arguably the State breached.
Although America's social contracts are based more on a
normative view of law and nature, and not on an actual physical
agreement, the terms are basically similar. In the context of, if not an
ideal, at least a nearly equitable presumed consent organ-taking and
transplantation plan, Americans would collectively suffer a detriment
for an equitable community benefit.266 Thus, all Americans would
contribute to a pool for organs, and all Americans would equitably
receive from that well.267 For example, all Americans regardless of
race, gender, and socioeconomic distinctions could withdraw from the
pool of body parts made available, and progressive efforts would be
made to minimize organ rejection, thereby achieving distributive
justice. However, an equitable social compact for presumed organtaking also requires the elimination of social valuing (the process by
which some doctors subjectively engage in determining which patients
should be referred for organ allocation).268 After all, economically
disenftanchised Americans should not be forced to participate as organ
donors and later suffer rejection or indefinite delays as organ recipients.
The social contract sounds ideal; indeed, it gives the impression
that all Americans are treated equally and possess the same leverage to
bargain for exchanges. However, social contract theory, what Allen
refers to as a "metaphor," "can hide what is unpleasant and unwanted,
and focus attention on what is pleasant and wanted., 269 In terms of
presumed consent, social contract theory can operate to focus on the
desired effect of maintaining public health, saving lives, and providing
biological materials to aid research. However, hidden behind the social
compact, or simply what is not acknowledged, is the racism and social
valuing that occurs in the health care industry in general, and
266

Fentiman, supra note 57, at 1598.

267

1d. But note that Fentiman does not address in any depth how racial disparities would

be overcome in her proposal. Neither are the historical racial disparities
discussed, which seem relevant to a discussion about legislative consent and
donation of organs. One reason for this oversight could be that substantive race
healthcare law, and disparities discussed in the context of civil rights and
obligations
are only recently emerging.
268
Jefferies, supranote 26.
269
Jefferies, supra note 26.

in healthcare
the presumed
discussions in
various other
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particularly in organ procurement and donation. ° In this capacity the
social compact avoids acknowledging painful racial realities and
historical inequities that directly influence why people choose not to
voluntarily donate, and why potential recipients of color face
innumerable obstacles in the waitlist process. 271 The hidden reality for
black Americans is that they are less likely than whites to be selected as
organ recipients, are more likely to have longer stays on waitlists, and
are more likely to die while waiting on organ lists. 272 In this way, the
"coercive dimensions of law" can operate to require certain things from
of community
some and not others, all under the misleading heading
273
self-interest.,
"rational
and
benefit, "consensualism"
Commentators supporting presumed consent policies based on
social compact theory must acknowledge that were such a compact to
exist, America's present transplantation system reveals a contract
worthy of being voided because it lacks accountability and mutual
benefit in response to detriment. To explicate, urban, poor Americans
are more likely than all other groups to be subjects of presumed consent
laws that are attached to autopsy statutes. 274 Mandatory autopsies, as
explained earlier, are more likely to occur in connection with certain
kinds of deaths that may disproportionately affect economically
including deaths -by violence,
disenfranchised urban Americans, 275
suicide.
and
poison,
causes,
unknown
Those more likely to be the subjects of these types of autopsies
would be under the control of the coroner or medical examiner who,
empowered by statute, is permitted to delegate the removal of the
deceased's organs. Other Americans, dying by other means, would not
27

PuttingPatients First-Allocation of Transplant Organ: Hearings Before the House
Commerce Comm. Subcomm. on Health and The Environment and the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Comm. and the Senate Labor and Human Resources Comm., 106th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1998) [hereinafter Callender Testimony] (testifying before a Congressional
subcommittee about institutionalized racism in healthcare, and particularly in organ allocation).
271
Gabriella Boston, Emory Addresses Reluctance ofBlack Organ Donors, ATLANTA J.
AND CONSTToN, May 6, 1999, at 9JA (identifying why blacks are more reluctant to donate,
including distrust of the medical community and racism); Roger Campbell, Too Many Blacks
Await Lifesaving Donations,ESSENCE, Apr. 1999, at 45.
272
supra note 270.
273Campbell,
Allen, supra note 235, at 15.
274
Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas,supra note 3.
27 See, e.g.,
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be subject to present presumed consent statutes, and as such, not
obligated to supply organs because their deaths would fall outside of
investigative or mandatory autopsy provisions. Therefore, coroners
would not have the authority to mutilate their bodies and retrieve
organs. Presumed consent policies, in general, are discomforting
because they disregard autonomy, privacy, and a right to choose how
one shall have her flesh used in the afterlife.276 Furthermore, even
those highly protected and regarded rights are increasingly threatened
and potentially impinged if, as in the case of presumed consent, one
belongs to a vulnerable or "othered" community (such as black, latino,
homeless, or white poor).277 Consider how presumed consent worked
in Los Angeles only a few years ago: over eighty percent (80%) of the
with whites making up only
uniformed donors were black and latino,
278
sixteen percent (16%) of the donor pool.

Over the years, the State's involvement with bodies has necessarily
influenced how others, namely those in the medical profession, will
approach certain bodies.279 Certainly, when Jefferies points to the
amoral consequences of social valuing in organ allocation, he is
focusing on practices that directly or indirectly result from a
government endorsed system. 28 0 Jefferies acknowledges that some
form of rationing must occur when resources are limited and there is a
social necessity to cure and heal. However, he writes, "due to the
shortage of organs.., physicians and other medical personnel make the
choice by weighing the patients' social worth.

' 28 1

He argues that

criteria could include "family-related considerations such as marital
status and number of dependents; other criteria are income, educational
background, employment record, relationship to authority figures, past
276

Jaffe, supra note 24, (arguing in general that presumed consent laws impinge on liberty,

autonomy, and the right to exclude); Coleman, supra note 76, at 19 (commenting that
"presumed consent implicates the substantive rights to bodily integrity and to privacy in
intimate decisions concerning a person's body")(footnotes omitted); Anderson, supra note 65,
at 258-63 (arguing that presumed consent supporters ignore the "interests from the donor side
which deserve the most protection").
of the equation
277
Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas,supranote 3.
278ld
"
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GRAy, supra note 230 (condemning the government-led program which studied the

effects of0 untreated syphilis in black men); JONES, supra note 259.
28Jefferies, supra note 26.
281

1d. at 626.
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irresponsible behavior," and intelligence. 28 2 Unfortunately, Jefferies'
enlightening analysis of the inequities found within a "social worth"
system end there. Nevertheless, the author does note that "[a] system
that decides who lives and dies based on considerations such as income
2 83
and education is unfortunate and may lead to inequitable results.
Finally, if a social contract in the area of healthcare ever existed
between black Americans and the State, and especially with regard to
organ transplantation, its compact was breached long ago. Evidence of
a social compact in healthcare for black Americans is difficult to
muster, and ultimately may be impossible to prove. Although one might
suggest that Medicaid and Medicare programs demonstrate a
commitment to groups with an "othered" status, especially blacks, such
arguments ultimately are weakened by the fact that those government
programs limit the types of services one might receive. For example,
Medicare covers immune suppressant treatments for only one year after
an organ is transplanted. 84 The natural consequences of life without
immune suppressant medication could mean rejecting an organ or
living in severe discomfort.
Typically, blacks that could benefit from organ transplantation
have been kept alive through dialysis, a time consuming and painful
process.2 85 Thus, for many of America's poorer citizens, organ
transplantation was not a possibility, and certainly not one advanced by
the State. Donna Shalala's recent campaign to end disparities was
hopeful, but results remain to be seen. One could make a very sound
argument that a healthcare compact could not exist, and certainly could
not be universally applied when Americans lack access to universal
healthcare coverage.
Indeed, there are other circumstances of healthcare inequality that
challenge the notion of a social compact existing between all
Americans and the State. Certainly, America's poor have experienced
extreme obstacles to obtaining services ranging from those addressing
282Id.
283

1d.

284ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 183.
285
1d. Abraham followed Robert Banes through what she refers to as the "transplant

game." In this game, black kidney patients are kept alive on dialysis, most hoping for
transplants, but some not realizing that they are not on organ transplantation waitlists. Id. at
179-97.
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mental health needs to prenatal care. Political activists argue that a
government reluctant to provide for its poorest and most vulnerable
citizens cannot expect the disenfranchised to forego religious practice
and sacrifice their bodies, as well as those of their deceased relatives, to
satisfy an interest
which disproportionately benefits a particularly
2 86
privileged group.

A social contract, along with any legal transaction, should be
granted legitimacy only according to its potential for equitable
implementation and results. A compact lacking equitable outcomes for
vulnerable populations resembles a coerced confession. In the law, we
seek to recognize only those agreements obtained legitimately, outside
the reach of duress and coercion. Ultimately, a social compact exists
only when a real social relationship exists. In this way, the party subject
to the State's compact must be valued, their contributions respected, and
their communities honored and afforded the rights and privileges
granted through the State's laws and policies.
PART V. CONCLUSION

Solutions are needed to properly and equitably address America's organ
shortage. Those solutions, as Nelson argues, cannot be quick fixes that
ignore the historical and contemporary racial dimensions of healthcare.
Is it possible to develop solutions for our organ transplantation system
without studying and understanding past inequities and injustices? I
think not. Our present healthcare system and the relationships between
white physicians and black patients are largely informed by inescapable
cultural realities. The cultural realities have, in part, helped to shape
cultural attitudes and norms with regard to how some bodies are valued
and treated. While we would hope that the arms of medicine would
operate beyond the reach of race, gender, and socio-economic politics
and realities, believing so would be unintelligent, and in light of
institutionalized racial oppression, perhaps would be expecting too
much.
This history can be overcome by sound reflections on healthcare
policies in general, which will ultimately trickle to organ procurement
286

See Anderson, supra note 65, at 279 n.105 ("voices of concern have already been
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and allocation. In the meantime, efforts taken by Jim Martin in
Kentucky, Kristen McCoy and her staff in Illinois, and transplant
procurement officials in Tennessee and Michigan all demonstrate that,
with a commitment to education and understanding, more people will
donate. In these states they experience an annual surplus of cornea
tissue that they are able to release for exportation to states with deficits,
the poor, and third world countries.
The central focus of organ procurement strategies should be
distributive justice and equity. Those objectives may best be achieved
through communication, education, and relationship building. These are
not accomplished in a vacuum; rather medical schools must train
doctors to be culturally competent so that they can communicate better
with patients of color and thus serve their patients more effectively.
Also, physicians of color are needed. It is a cultural imperative that the
ranks of physicians achieve diversity. Achieving this goal means
increasing enrollment and retention of students of color at American
medical schools, where 287
numbers of medical doctors of color continue
low.
to be exceptionally
Building trust in communities of color is crucial. Dr. Clive
Callender and other medical scholars have recently expressed such
sentiments before Congress and in the national media. More people of
color are needed in the discussions about healthcare and the role of law,
both as scholars and laypersons receiving services. Accountability from
communities of color should not be overlooked (e.g., improving health
habits); however, it seems that a moral obligation of fairness and access
to healthcare services is owed to communities that have historically
experienced racial discrimination in the forms of medical and legal
exploitation. Trust must be won. Finally, overcoming racial disparities
can be achieved through a more equitable distribution, of healthcare
services in the physician's office. Patients need information, regular
visits with physicians, and better communication about their options.

287

Minority populations grew 18.5% between 1975 and 1990, but minority medical
school enrollment rose only 7%. Dennis P. Andrulis, The National Public Health and Hospital
Institute, New Dimensions and Directions in Inner-City Health Care, at
http:llwwv.acponline.org/hpp/pospaper/andrulis.htm, citing Satcher Rivo, Improving access to
health care throughphysician workforce reform, JAMA, 1993 at 270.
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